

Report by Japanese Government, "Burma-Thailand Railway".

Report on Employment of War Prisoners in  
Siam-Burma Railway Construction.

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PREFACE

1. The so-called brutal treatment of Allied prisoners of war during the construction of the Siam-Burma Railway shall be divided into two categories; (1) Misconduct in the form of direct cruelty to the prisoners of war (the cases known as maltreatment of prisoners), and (2) incidents involving a considerable number of deaths from illness among the prisoners during the work. Cases coming under the first category shall be dealt with as cases of ordinary maltreatment of prisoners, whereas the unfortunate incidents coming under the second were caused under the circumstances that were unavoidable during the waging of war. It should, therefore, be noted that there is a distinct difference in character between cases (1) and (2).

2. In the present report, a plain statement will be made of the actual state of affairs and of the treatment of the prisoners of war which have led to the comparatively large number of deaths from sickness during the construction of the railway under (1).

Under Part 1 of this report the protests made by the Allied Powers will be dealt with; under Part 2 a description will be given regarding the investigations conducted into general affairs relative to the prisoners' treatment and the special cases of those under protest, and finally Part 3 will give the measures taken by the Japanese authorities in respect to the foregoing (2) (judicial decisions).

With regard to cruelty directly inflicted on prisoners under (1), no data are available in Tokyo, and liaison with the Japanese troops on the spot is at the moment virtually impossible, for which reason the cases under (1) are excluded from this report. Accordingly it is hoped that inquiries will be made on the spot by the Allied Powers in respect thereto.

3. Although the construction of the Siam-Burma Railway was completed in October 1943, some of the prisoners were still employed in repair work on the termination of the war, but the present report chiefly describes the situation during the construction of the railway.

Summary of Statement in House of Commons by Sir James Grigg, British Secretary for War, on Maltreatment of British Prisoners of War in Burma and Siam.

Out of some 1,300 English and Australian prisoners of war, about 150 were rescued by a U.S. Submarine and English survivors have recently returned home.

In view of their health conditions, only preliminary examinations have so far been made, but further statements will be made with the progress of the examinations of the survivors.



As a result of the examination, the Japanese treatment of prisoners of war in the southern parts of East Asia, has, for the first time, been brought to light and by this the policy adopted by the Japanese militarists in the treatment of the prisoners of war in Burma, Siam and East Indies has been ascertained beyond any doubt. But it should be noted that the present information has nothing to do with the treatment given to the prisoners of war and civilian internees at the camps in Hong Kong, Formosa, the occupied territory of China, Korea and Japan proper; treatment in those places seems to be comparatively lenient.

The prisoners in Singapore and Java were at the beginning of 1942, transferred to Burma and Siam, and Australian prisoners to Burma by sea. In the transportation, they were crowded into holds of ships, four feet high. The English war prisoners were transported by train from Singapore to Siam and they were so crowded that the men could not lie down during the whole five days of the journey. Then they were forced to march on foot for 80 miles.

They were compelled to work for the railway construction in the disease infected and insect-full jungle area together with natives who were engaged in compulsory labor. The camps were poorly equipped against squalls and heat peculiar to the tropical zone and the Japanese did not replace worn-out clothing. Food was supplied three times a day, each ration consisting of some rice and one pint of water. The labor was continued at the cost of human lives and pains to prisoners no matter how great they might be and no rest was given. The death rate estimated at a minimum was 20%.

As the construction of the railway was completed in October 1943, all the prisoners except those who were engaged in the maintenance work, were transferred to camps in Siam. The camps there could shelter the men from rain and the food situation and sanitary conditions were improved. Those men thought to be suitable for a certain kind of work were removed to French Indies for a time and then transferred to Singapore on their way to Japan. The war prisoners who were rescued, had been on a board a steamer which departed from Singapore at the beginning of September and 1,300 English and Australian prisoners were aboard.

When the steamer was sunk, the Japanese were busy rescuing their own people and the war prisoners were left to their fate; consequently most of them died.

In presenting this to the House of Commons, I would like to express our profound thanks to the U.S. Submarines for efforts they made to rescue our survivors in disregard of the danger to themselves and also for the care they took of the rescued men.

We have asked protecting Powers to make the strongest possible protest to the Japanese.



From the accounts of all the survivors I saw to my surprise that, despite the treatment of the Japanese, the morale of our prisoners of war had been maintained. Especially, our surgeon miraculously achieved a high measure of success in attending to the sick and wounded in spite of the insufficiency of medicines and medical facilities.

I can't express my profound sympathy toward the relatives and friends of the prisoners of war. I regret that the matter has not been publicly announced, but it is necessary to let the Japanese Government know that we have come to possess these facts. We are collecting information from the survivors. All the details of the accounts which they give of other prisoners of war shall be immediately communicated to their next kin -- and, while the present report is in preparation we have obtained from our protecting powers the information that the Japanese Government has not permitted representatives of the International Red Cross or of the protective powers to visit the prisoners of war camps in the areas occupied by Japan.

The above fact explodes the denial by the Japanese Government of the Foreign Secretary's Commons statement regarding the treatment of prisoners of war detained in Burma and Thailand.

This outrageous treatment of prisoners of war constitutes one reason for our continuing warlike endeavors, even after the termination of the war with Germany until we thoroughly crush, in cooperation with our Allied Powers, the baneful militaristic autocracy which reigns supreme in present Japan.

Tentative Translation of the Oral Message  
dated July 4, 1944 from Swiss Legation, Tokyo.

By the letter dated September 15, 1944, addressed to His Excellency General Hideki Tojo, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by the latter dated December 9, 1944, to His Excellency Masayuki Tani, the Swiss Minister had the honor to communicate the apprehensions which the British Government entertained as to the maltreatment accorded the prisoners of war at the Rangoon Camp. The London Government furnished, at the same time, a certain number of detailed facts relative to the same treatment.

By letter No 33/C R., dated February 1945, His Excellency Foreign Minister answered to the Swiss Minister that the facts as mentioned in the above letter did not exist.

The Swiss Minister never failed to convey the contents of this letter to his Government in behalf of the U.K. Government.

The Swiss Legation has the honor to acquaint the Minister of Foreign Affairs with the fact that the British Government has, in a new communication made the following request to the Imperial Government for information as regards the treatment of the prisoners of war in Burma.

"1. First complaint concerns area of Moulmein and falls under three headings:

A. Notifications: According to postcards printed by the Japanese Authorities, about 20,000 British and Allied prisoners of war are detained in or near Moulmein. Transfer of prisoners of war to this camp has never been notified; and it is believed that capture of many prisoners of war now in this and other Burmese camps has also never been notified. Nor has any notification been received of numerous deaths that are known to have occurred there.

B. Conditions: Conditions under which prisoners of war in Moulmein camp are detained are known to His Majesty's Government to be at least as bad as, if not worse, than those which existed in Thailand (c.f. the letter of the Swiss Minister to His Excellency Mamoru Shigemitsu, dated 5 July 1943).

During October and November 1942, prisoners of war in Moulmein itself are known to have died at rate of approximately 10 per diem; the principal cause of death being dysentery. In other camps administered by the Japanese authorities in or near Moulmein an even more appalling rate of mortality has occurred amongst prisoners of war working on that Burmese railway. These deaths are direct and inevitable result of conditions in camps and in particular of the wholly inadequate rations provided by the Japanese authorities, of the latter's failure to provide medicines or equipment in hospitals, of almost complete lack of adequate clothing or even footwear and of severity of labor exacted from prisoners of war.

C. Exhibition of prisoners: In February of 1944, 25 prisoners of war were paraded through the town of Moulmein. They were in an emaciated condition and were forced to carry notices in Burmese stating that they had recently been captured on the Arakan front (which was not the case.) They were further held up to ridicule and contempt by a Japanese officer who accompanied the parade. Such proceeding are clearly contrary to honorable standards of warfare and unworthy of a nation calling itself civilized, apart from being a breach of Article 2 of the Prisoners of War Convention.

Letter dated December 4, 1944 from Swiss Minister to Minister of Foreign Affairs (Protest by British and Australian Governments)  
Tentative Translation of the Letter dated December 4, 1944 from Swiss Minister to Minister of Foreign Affairs.

I have the honor to acquaint Your Excellency with the fact that the British and Australian Governments have requested my Government to convey the following communication to the Japanese Government.

Some 150 Australian and United Kingdom survivors from the Japanese transport S.S. "Rakuyo Maru" torpedoed in South China Sea on September 12, have reached Australia and Great Britain. Following is a brief summary of the knowledge which has consequently come into the possession

of His Majesty's Governments in the United Kingdom and Australia regarding treatment of British and Australian prisoners of war by Japanese military authorities; all available prisoners of war in Singapore and Java were moved early in 1942 to Burma or Thailand. Australians were sent by sea to Burma crowded into ships' holds which had been horizontally subdivided so that ceilings were no more than 4 feet high. Prisoners from the United Kingdom were sent by rail to Thailand so crowded into steel cattle trucks that they could not even lie down during the journey. They were then marched some 80 miles. All were sent to work on the construction of a railway through primitive disease infected jungle in Thailand and Burma. Conditions under which all these men lived and worked were inhuman; such accommodation as was provided gave little or no protection against tropical rains or blazing sun. Worn out clothing was not replaced and soon many lacked clothing, boots and head covering. The only food provided was a pannaikin of rice and a small quantity of watery stew three times a day but work had to go on without respite whatever cost in human suffering or life. The inevitable result was a dreadful death rate, the lowest estimate being 20 per cent. These conditions continued until the railway was finished about October, 1943, when those not needed for maintenance work were moved to camps in Thailand and later to Singapore en route to Japan.

The rescued men were on a ship which left Singapore early in September 1944. There were probably 1300 United Kingdom and Australian prisoners of war on board. After she was sunk, the Japanese deliberately picked up all Japanese survivors but left the prisoners to their fate. Statements of our men constitute direct and unimpeachable evidence of the outrageous treatment by the Japanese of defenseless prisoners of war.

I add that I communicated to His Excellency Minister Suzuki in the letter dated November 18, that the rescued men from Gakuyo Maru according to British information, arrived in England and Australia and that a public announcement would be given in both countries on the basis of the accounts of those men as to the maltreatment accorded the prisoners of war in Thailand and Burma.

I hereby express my high regard to Your Excellency.

Swiss Minister



## Part II MATTERS OF INVESTIGATION

## General Outline

1. By order of the Imperial General Headquarters, the preparations for the construction of this railway were commenced in June 1942 by the South Army with the view of using it as a ground supply route and a trade and traffic one between Thailand and Burma, being urged on by the proposal of the South Army and the construction work was virtually begun in November 1942 in hopes of completing it by the end of 1943. But while counter attacks, particularly bombings, of the British Indian Army rapidly became fierce and the situations in this area considerably serious since the end of the rainy season of 1942, our sea-transportation from Malay to Burma gradually became hard. As there could be found no ground transport route for its substitute, it was clearly estimated that, if the situations were left as they were till the end of the next rainy season, transportation to Burma would be almost entirely interrupted and even the defence of the area, not to mention positive actions, impossible and further more the work itself quite difficult. For these reasons the Imperial General Headquarters ordered early in February 1943 to shorten the term of the work by 4 months. With this the South Army, together with the leading staffs of the General Headquarters, urged the work on, taking the best possible measures and the working troops also did their best, so that the work made favorable progress for the time being. However, as the rainy season earlier than usual set in, in addition to the bad conditions in jungles since April or March of 1943 which the Japanese Army had never encountered before, victims of the work gradually increased, not to speak of the delay of scheduled work. Confronted with these bad conditions, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered at last to postpone the period of the work by 2 months in spite of the fact that this order had a grave influence upon the operations in Burma, considering the general situations of Burma front at that time, and that the prospect of communication with Burma was becoming clear with the partial completion of the railway and local employment of newly constructed roads and waterways paralled with the railway.

2. It is not unnatural that a great many persons should be employed in such construction work in order to strengthen operation capacity. Though the South Army levied laborers on the spot and employed them in the work besides Japanese troops, it was so difficult to gather a great many laborers immediately that the South Army asked permission to employ POW's in the work of the Imperial General Headquarters. Considering that the work was carried on in the rear far away from the first front, and that the railway would serve in the future as a trade route between Thailand and Burma, the Imperial General Headquarters complied with the request and sanctioned the employment of POW's. Then the forced construction work was carried out in precipitous jungles spreading over 400 k.m. conquering natural hindrances such as influence of bad weather, particularly that of the rainy season and the environment injurious to health etc. and surmounting technical hindrances, such as time-limit due to operational needs, imperfect preparation due to it, inadequate accommodations along the L. of C. and inferior technical skill of the Japanese Army.

3. Though the Japanese Army did its best in taking the best possible measures conceivable at that time in order to improve the treatment of the POW's cooperating with the Japanese troops, laying stress on billeting, ration and health, many POW's fell victim of the work at last much to our regret.

We should like to declare the Japanese troops participated in the joys and sorrows of the POW's and native laborers in the construction work, and by no means completed or intended to complete the work only at the sacrifice of POW's.

(NOTE) The Director of construction cherished the motto "POW's and and laborers are Fathers of Construction," and consequently endeavored to improve the treatment of POW's.

#### Chapter I. GENERAL OUTLINE OF CONSTRUCTION PROGRESS.

##### Section 1. Details of the Construction and State of Affairs in the Earlier State (from June 1942 to the middle of February 1943)

###### A. Details of the construction.

1. With the development of the North Burma operation, to construct a railway connecting Thailand and Burma as an operational supply route and a trade and traffic one between both countries had become so urgent that the South Army proposed its construction to the Imperial General Headquarters. Therefore the latter directed its preparation to the former in June of the same year.

2. The preparations of the constructions are summarized as follows:

- (1) Route: About 400 km, from Nonpradoc to Tambisaya, along the River Neonoi.
- (2) Transportation capacity: About 3,000 tons a day to each direction.
- (3) Period: Scheduled to complete by the end of 1943.
- (4) Materials: Mainly to use the materials on the spot and a part is transferred from the home islands.
- (5) Military strength: The Railway Inspection Office, 2 railway regiments, the Railway Material Depot and some other auxiliary troops.
- (6) Labor (auxiliary personnel): Laborers levied on the spot and POW's.

3. In conformity with the above preparation items, the South Army, setting about survey along the railway, negotiations with Thailand, establishment of construction bases, preparation of construction materials, arrangements for laborers, survey of military geography and sanitary arrangements, moved the railway units in Burma to the construction bases one after another and made them deploy. Thus it prepared for the construction.

As the negotiations with Thailand were concluded at the beginning of November of the same year, the order of the Imperial General Headquarters concerning execution of the railway construction was issued and soon after, in accordance with the above items the order concerning the construction was issued by the South Army.

4. The Chief inspector of the Second Railway Inspection Office (staying in Bangkok) took command of the following units of which the South Army Railway Corps was composed. The 5th Railway Regiment (its base was in Tambisaya) was allotted the duty of construction on the Thailand-side, and the 9th Railway Regiment (its base was in Kanchanaburi) that on the Burma-side. The main part of the 1st Railway Material Depot was deployed in Nonpradac and the other part in Rangun. Thus the preparations made progress step by step, and virtual construction work was begun in December, complying with the above mentioned orders.

The South Army Railway Corps.

COMMANDER: The Chief Inspector of the Second Railway Inspection Office Major General Shimoda

The Second Railway Inspection Office  
The Fifth Railway Regiment  
The Ninth Railway Regiment  
The First Material Depot  
Two units serving on land  
Two building units  
Two field well-drilling units  
The Field Epidemic prevention and Water-supply Depot Co-operators.  
The Thailand Internment Camp  
The Field Supply Park.

5. The Thailand Internment Camp, having finished preparations, cooperated in the construction work from the beginning by order of the South Army.

6. Allotment of duties, business system, system of POW's and outline of duties, concerning the construction are shown in Annex 1, 2 and 3.




## Annex I

## ALLOTMENT OF DUTIES CONCERNING THE RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

OFFICE AND UNIT	RESPONSIBILITY	DUTY AND BUSINESS
Imperial General Headquarters.	Directions concerning the Railway Construction	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Negotiations with the Ministry of War concerning estimate and materials.</li> <li>2. Diplomatic negotiations through the Ministry of War.</li> <li>3. Orders concerning the railway construction (directives of the Imperial General Headquarters).</li> <li>4. To help supply of materials necessary for the construction.</li> <li>5. Directions of the construction complying with the operational needs.</li> <li>6. To decide whether the employment of POW's is appropriate.</li> </ol>
South General Army	Chief Supervisor of Railway Construction.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. To estimate and concentrate military strength and labor necessary for the railway construction. Supply, maintenance and sanitary arrangements for them.</li> <li>2. To make POW's cooperate with the construction units or to allot them to the units.</li> <li>3. Directions concerning the employment of POW's.</li> <li>4. Planning of the railway construction.</li> <li>5. To keep harmony between the railway construction units and cooperating attached units.</li> <li>6. Maintenance of traffic routes and waterways necessary for the construction.</li> </ol>
Railway Inspection Office	Commander-in-Charge of Railway Construction	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Inspection survey and construction of the route according to the railway construction plan.</li> <li>2. Employment of the railway units and attached units.</li> <li>3. To make POW's and laborers cooperate with the railway units or to allot them to the units.</li> <li>4. Directions concerning the employment of POW's.</li> <li>5. Negotiations with the Internment Camp concerning the employment of POW's.</li> <li>6. To take care of billeting, maintenance and health of POW's.</li> </ol>

OFFICE AND UNIT	RESPONSIBILITY	DUTY AND BUSINESS
Railway Regiment	Commander in charge of Rail- way construction in the allotted district.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Construction of railway in the allotted district.</li><li>2. Employment of the allotted and co-operating POW's according to the directives of the commander in charge of railway construction.</li><li>3. Negotiations with persons in charge of supervising POW's.</li><li>4. To take care of billeting, maintenance and health of POW's.</li></ol>
Internment Camp	To assist and control the rail- way construction in the capacity of the supervisor of POW's.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. To make POW's cooperate with the rail- way construction units or to allot them to the units by order of the South General Army.</li><li>2. Negotiations with railway construction units concerning the employment of POW's.</li><li>3. Chiefly to take care of billeting maintenance and health of POW's and to request assistance to the units concerned.</li><li>4. Execution of the business of super- vising POW's.</li></ol>

## Annex 2


BUSINESS SYSTEM CONCERNING THE RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION.







## Annex 3

CHART SHOWING SYSTEM OF EMPLOYING POW's AND  
ALLOTING DUTIES FOR THE RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION



(B) State of Affairs in the earlier stage (from June 1942 to the middle of February 1943).

1. In accordance with the above details, the preparatory works such as survey work, collection of materials necessary to maintenance of the bases and a part of ground-construction etc. were commenced.

The construction was commenced from both sides, Thailand and Burma, and the supply in the rear was assisted by the Army stationing in Thailand in the case of the former and by the Burma Army Group in the case of the latter.

2. Virtual construction work was commenced in November, 1942; an order to put it into practice being given.

3. However, the areas where the railway was to be constructed were covered with great jungles and if we had waited the completion of the survey of the whole route, the construction period would have been so prolonged that the work was carried out keeping pace with the survey. Therefore, as to estimation of quantity of labor and materials, sufficient measures could not be prearranged.

4. In January 1943 when the work was smoothly progressing, Major General Shimoda, the commander of the construction, while patrolling over the construction area in an airplane, in order to inspect the work, was killed by crashing against a border mountain between Thailand and Burma, Major Irie, the chief staff of the construction, riding with him in the same plane was also killed at the same time.

5. In this period the number of POW's increased by degrees and POW's in Java and Singapore were transferred to the construction areas. The Thailand Internment Camp gradually enlarged itself and assisted the construction work on the Thailand-side with main strength while that on the Burma-side with the other strength.

## SECTION II State of Affairs in the Period during which the Construction was urged on.

(From the middle of Feb. 1943 to the middle of July, 1943)

A. How and why the construction period was cut short.

1. Since the end of the rainy season of 1942, the counter-attack on Burma of the British Indian Army became so rapidly violent and the situations in this area so serious; the British Army being steadily reinforced with military strength and goods. Besides, the only transport route by sea became so dangerous as was almost interrupted by the enemy's disturbance both from the sea and air. Hence the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters keenly felt the necessity of completing the railway connecting Thailand and Burma and intended to urge the construction on.

Namely at that time transportation of military strength and goods with which the Burma Army Group was being greatly reinforced to cope with the critical situations in Burma caused by the counter-attack of the British Indian Army, relied on the sea route from Singapore alone. But in addition to the shortage of shipping this route was extremely menaced both by the enemy planes and submarines and thus the prospects of transportation increasingly became dark. Though we tried to cut a road from Roheng to Moulmein via Mesot, it was unsuccessful as too many trucks were required and the labor was out of proportion to the effect. At last we faced such plight as we had to rely upon forced supply executed by small boats.

This transportation by force could be barely executed by taking advantage of the rainy season and was expected to be available only till September 1943. Under the circumstance that suspension of the sea transport and general counter attack of the British Indian Army were expected immediately after the rainy season, a ground transport route for its substitute was absolutely necessary for the Japanese army. Moreover, it was expected that unless it was completed by the end of the next rainy season, the Army group operating in Burma would come to a crisis and at the same time the construction of the railway connecting Thailand and Burma would become quite difficult.

The Imperial General Headquarters, not to mention the South Army, were much anxious about the circumstance and discussed the counter-measures and tried to find a break in the deadlock. Finally they could not but conclude that there was no other way than to complete by the end of the rainy season the railway connecting Thailand and Burma under construction at that time and intended to cut short the construction period, having been driven to the last extremity.

2. Then, the Imperial General Headquarters consulted with the South Army, and being aware of many difficulties such as shortage of military strength, labor and materials, great amount of the work, destructive influence of the rainy season and unhealthy surroundings, yet both agreeing upon speeding up of the work by all possible means and shortening of the work, took necessary measures respectively. Viz, estimating the whole amount of the earth-work from the result of the survey executed by that time and prudently examining the military strength, labor and materials the Headquarters lowered the construction gauge (from 3,000 tons a day to each direction to 1,000 tons) and as to military strength, labor and material, took every measure possible in the capacity of the Central office, expecting to shorten the construction period of 4 months and to complete the work by the end of August 1943.

They can be summarized as follows:

(1) To restore the 4th Battalion, the 5th Railway Regiment in Kwantung to the home regiment. To alter the demobilization schedule of the 4th Auxiliary Railway Unit and to prepare for its allotment to the railway construction units.

(2) To deliver 150 km. rails which are under charge of the central office and reserved in the south area, many rock-drills and a large quantity of explosive.

(3) To despatch medical veterans in order to intensify measures against malaria.

3. As the tactical situations in East New Guinea were critical at that time, and breakdown of the fighting front in this area expected imminent, quick reinforcement to the front of West New Guinea and Banda Sea areas was being carried out; transportation units, supply depots and airfield construction units which could be diverted to this purpose, were despatched or were en route to these areas. As to laborers, they were insufficient to a certain degree, owing to the necessity of building up self-support industry on the spot caused by insufficient supply to the South Army, airfield construction for defence and despatching laborers to the above diverted units: shortage of labor was rising even in the over-populated Java. Then the South Army, according to the order to cut short the construction period of the Thailand-Burma railway, diverted the following units which had been by that time employed in urgent operational duties to the railway construction, and at the same time ordered that each sector commander of Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, Malaya and Java districts should give assistance to the railway construction, and took appropriate measures especially in the systematic supply and maintenance of laborers. As to POW's, they were transferred there all the way from French Indo-China and Java, taking into consideration the above mentioned situation. Thus we tried to increase labor capacity.

(1) The 4th Auxiliary Railway Unit, the 41st Independence Garrison Infantry Battalion, the Imperial Guards Railway Regiment, the 54th Engineer Regiment, the 42nd L. of C. Area Unit, the Field Construction Service Unit of the 14th Division, main part of the Epidemic Prevention and Water-supply Depot of the South Army and the Field Hospital of the 21st Division.

(2) Two internment branch camps in Malaya (about 10,000 POW's).

(3) A motor-car company and 300 trucks.

#### B. Transition of situations.

1. Because of the arrival at the construction spot of the military strength, labor, POW's and construction materials reinforced according to the above measures, the work further progressed since the end of March.

2. After Major General Shimoda's death Major General Takasaki succeeded him as the commander of the railway construction, and arrived at the spot in the middle of February of the same year, and the work was being eagerly carried on as before.



3. Contrary to our expectation, the rainy season set in one April in Thailand and in the middle of April in Burma, which influence upon the work and supply were tremendous.

4. At the same time, cholera which had been prevalent in some areas of Burma, was spread over the border line between Thailand and Burma, and simultaneously with the setting-in of the rainy season, became increasingly prevalent. June was its most prevalent time when there broke out about 6,000 cases (of which 1,200 were the POW's) of which about 4,000 proved fatal (of which about 500 odd were the POW's). Thus many fell victim of the work in a short time. As this fact inspired fear in the laborers on the spot, many fled away and even some cases stole out of a hospital. The situations, dangerous both from the view-point of epidemic prevention and the work itself, were brought about.

5. As cholera was prevailing, the Headquarters not only dispatched medical authorities there, but sent some staff officers in order to make them take necessary steps, and the South Army, also, often dispatched principal medical officers and some staff officers in order to cope with the situation: the construction units fulfilled their duties, overcoming unfavorable circumstances: the prisoners of war earnestly cooperated with them.

6. On the other hand, as an emergency road for automobiles and the newly constructed railway were often destroyed and the bridges often washed away because of the long heavy rain, the ground transportation was apt to be tied up, and as it was impossible to sail up the Keonoi to the upper reaches for one month, its rising being slow, we were frequently faced with a crisis.

Particularly, the construction unit on the Burma-side, having no parallel waterways, toiled and moiled at the construction of a rain-tight road, by which it could transport necessary materials. For this reason, the railway construction work was inevitably suspended for a while. The construction unit on the Thailand-side, waiting the rising of the Keonoi, made use of it and narrowly escaped starvation. At that time though rations to units in the innermost regions was below the standard owing to such circumstances, yet considering the characteristics of POW's food, scores of cattle were driven by land in order to supply them with meat.

7. The above-mentioned difficulty of transportation caused delay of supply and gave rise to malaria, endemic, and gastroenteric disorder, together with malnutrition. Coupled with difficulty in medical supply, the number of the patients increased in spite of the toil of medical units.

It is clear that the prisoners of war who were not used to wild life, would greatly suffer.



8. Towards the end of April, Major General Takasaki, the commander of the railway construction, caught malaria, and yet he continued to fulfill his duty until he fell down on bed. The situations came to the worst.

9. The working units, however, endeavored to fulfill their duty, overcoming all difficulties.

Sect. III How and why the period of construction work was delayed by two months and state of affairs during that period. (From the middle of July to October, 1943).

1. Confronted with the state of affairs above-mentioned, the Imperial General Headquarters dispatched the Director of Transportation and Communication and members of the General Staff to the scene of construction work to observe the state of affairs there, and came to the conclusion that if the forced work were to be continued with the aim of completing the plan by the end of August, nothing but unnecessary sacrifice would follow; and considering the general situations of Burma front at that time, the prospect of communication with Burma becoming clear with the partial completion of the railway, and local employment of newly constructed roads and waterways parallel with the railway, order was at last given to delay the completion of the construction work by two months in order to reduce victims, in spite of the fact that this order had a grave influence upon the operations in Burma area. Major General Ishida was newly appointed to the director of construction for perfect realization of this scheme.

2. Major General Ishida, the new director of construction arrived at his post on the sixteenth of August 1943. He aimed at the completion of the work by the end of October, renewed the organization of the staff, endeavored to stimulate the morale, and was always in the van of the party, the main object of reorganization being in the innovation and improvement of the supervision of working conditions.

He cherished the slogan. 'Prisoners of war and laborers are fathers of construction', corrected the erroneous idea of 'mastership' prevailing among the officers and men, and was foremost in making personal inspection and improvement of the normal life of the prisoners of war.

3. The rainy season which culminated in August, gradually reduced the amount of rainfall, and the working party did their best for the completion of the work, surmounting ever increasing difficulties in the innermost regions. The activities of the water line of communications making use of the River Kechol and the strenuous efforts of the working troops and the cooperating units in carrying on forced work favored the coordination between the preservation of military strength and labor (completion of supply work begun at the ending of the rainy season in September at the ends in the inner regions) and the execution of tasks.

Thus, on the seventeenth of October, 1943, the two railways, started from east and west, 415 Kilometers in length, were joined together at Konkaiter and the formal ceremonies for the opening took place on the 25th of the same month.

Sect. IV Conditions after the completion of the  
Construction (from Nov. 1943 to Aug. 1945)

1. With the completion of the construction work, the South General Army, in accordance with the general situation at that time, took greatest care in restoring the health of the prisoners of war, enlarged and improved the sanitary arrangement at Thai Internment Camp and endeavored to concentrate prisoners of war at salubrious quarters where billeting and supply were easily accessible, two branch camps of the Malay Internment Camps being merged to the Main Internment Camp in Shonen (Singapore).

2. The railway working troops cooperated in the concentration activities, rendered services in sending back invalid prisoners, in accommodating billet facilities, and employed not more than one thousand healthy prisoners in urgent and indispensable supplementary construction work, the rest being left with lessened labor. By special order of the Director of Construction, a monument was erected each in Thailand and Burma to console these departed spirits of the prisoners of war and ordinary laborers engaged in this construction work, a mass was held and their souls (deeply venerated in the fashion of Imperial Japanese ceremony.)

3. The railway working troops also wheeled round successfully into Burma, and from March 1944 on, the remaining work was carried out entirely by a party mainly composed of the 4th Special Railway Unit, and part of the staffs of the Thai Internment Camp cooperated in the remaining work while the main body tried to regain their physical strength, only making preparations for sending prisoners back to Japan.

4. From that time on, thousands of prisoners of war were employed for maintaining railway services until the end of the war, being taken special care of the preservation and improvement of their health.

During this period, there were no small casualties suffered by the Allied air bombing.

CHAPTER XI

Influence on the Construction and on the supervision  
of POW's, its countermeasures and their realization.

Section 1.

Various factors making difficult the construction and supervision  
of POW's:

(A) Technical hindrances.

1. Operational demands restricted the term of construction work (N.B. to be completed in about ten months after it was started in earnest). This was a forced construction and there followed many unreasonable demands in various quarters.

2. The inexperience of the Japanese Army in great construction work in the jungle made it especially difficult for them to make fair estimation of their work there, which was the great cause of miscarrying the programme and hampering the execution of construction work, and they found it very difficult to make scrupulous and appropriate preparations beforehand.

3. The Japanese Army were poor in mechanized tools and materials and in the equipment of supply.

They had to accomplish this work with manpower, instead of mechanical power, with no small waste of physical strength which followed.

(B) Natural hindrances.

1. The construction was a hazardous one which had to be carried out through the geographical hindrance of a great jungle belt extending on the border of Thailand and Burma untrodden before, where epidemics and pestilence are prevalent. This construction work was 415 kilometers in length, the total amount of earthwork 4,000,000 cubic meters, rock-clearing about 300,000 cubic metres, the total length of bridging about 15 kilometres.

On the Thai side, there were rather too many spots on the line where rock-clearing had to be done: the River Maecon had to be crossed near the base, and excavation of cliffs was necessary in order to go along the Keonoi Valley.

On the Burma side, the two rivers, Shittan and Salwin, hindered supply from the base in Rangun. (N.B. the iron railway bridge on the Shittan had been destroyed, and the working troops hurriedly constructed a wooden railway bridge 2 kilometres in length, and ran locomotives brought from Burma.)

Roads were the only routes of supply, there were no waterways running in parallel, many rivers intersecting the line of construction.

2. Generally speaking, the temperature is high with high percentage of humidity, but among the mountains, it is chilly in January, and, during the rainy season, the temperature sometimes falls.



In this district, we suffer a good deal from the influence of the rainy season, especially on the Burma side. (N.B. Tenasserim District is noted for its maximum rainfall). During the rainy season, hurriedly constructed motor roads and newly built railroads were very difficult to maintain, and were a great cause of hindering supply. On the Thai side, since the middle of May, a through motor car communication was suspended, on the Burma side, with difficulty kept up by every available means.

When the waters of the Keonci rose, it could be utilized for navigation, serving as a line of communication, but when in flood was rather a hindrance to communication. Also, immediately after the rainy season sets in, no navigation is possible for about twenty days when the waters rise slowly. During this period, there lurks the danger of suspension of through communication both on land and on water. On the Burma side, both railway bridges and road bridges on the Mezari and Winyau (both rapids, with driftwoods in them) were swept away and the supply was in crisis.

### 3. Bad sanitary conditions.

Malignant malaria is prevalent in those regions where the construction work was carried on. Moreover such epidemics as cholera, pest, small-pox etc. are raging all the year round. The influence of the rainy season and the native laborers brought into these regions made worse the sanitary conditions there.

Another hindrance to be specially noticed is the fact that the rainy season set in one month earlier than usual. For this reason, various countermeasures against the rainy season had not yet been complete, when we were taken by surprise, with the consequence that most of our utmost endeavor came to nothing. The effect was decisive and fatal to our work, supply and maintenance, to the sanitary arrangements etc., and coupled with the simultaneous sudden prevalence of cholera, the construction work and the superintendence of prisoners became much more difficult, and the number of victims increased.

## Sect II. Various countermeasures and their execution. Summary.

1. The success of this construction solely depended upon the preparedness in the rearward area. Therefore, the South General Army fully acknowledged the necessity of:

- (1) Preparation for supply
- (2) Measures for sanitary arrangement.
- (3) Securing and maintaining labor
- (4) Securing and pooling of materials of construction, and every endeavor was made for the realization of this plan.

2. In June 1942, at the time when order was going to be given for the preparation of this construction work, the South Army had dispatched line of communication troops, especially transport troops to other front (mainly in Burma) and owing to the scarcity of transportation capacity to send for these troops to the scene, the construction work made no rapid



progress. Moreover, there was a great flood in the autumn of 1943 in the basin of the river Menam in the central plain of Thailand, and Bangkok, one of the base depots on the line of communications, was under water, became like an isolated island, and greatly hampered the preparations for construction.

3. On the other hand, these preparations in the rear were being made through diplomatic negotiations with Thai Government, and no speedy solution could be hoped for. Under these circumstances various preparations could not be made satisfactorily, and we were obliged to begin the construction work step by step.

4. In February 1943, two months after the construction was started in earnest, the necessity of operations due to the circumstances above mentioned suddenly demanded curtailment by four months of the period of construction, and every measure was taken to cope with the situation. The Imperial General Headquarters and the South Army did their best in lowering the gauge of construction, and in increasing fighting strength and material, the working party was no less active in making desperate efforts for the realization of the plan.

But these counter-measures of shortening the period of construction were not speedily put into execution for various reasons: especially the road for concentrating troops was stretching too far and the transportation capacity too low.

The concentration of fighting troops, labor and supply was at its height during the rainy season (the earlier setting-in of the rainy season cannot be overlooked), and it was our greatest regret that we could not fully display our fighting strength.

(A) Supply and maintenance.

1. With the curtailment of construction period, establishment of supply system became a burning question for securing and maintaining the increased military strength and labor. But in this period, there was a serious lack in the line of communication troops (which were the main force in this area), especially in motor trucks, and it was not before the earlier part of April, 1943 that the deployment was over of the line of communication troops (which had by every means been extracted and allotted to this area and that systematic supply in the construction area was started. The delay of making preparations for line of communication system, coupled with the early setting in of the rainy season, made the general counter-measures for rainy season discordant, followed by the difficulties of supply during that season.

2. Measures taken for the establishment of supply and transportation system were as follows:

(a) Emphasis was laid on the counter-measures for the rainy season, and considering the topographical characteristics, on the Burma side, preparations were made, from the outset, for the construction of

rain-tight roads, and on the side of Thailand, hurried construction of motor roads parallel with the railway was urged. At the same time, we were ready for utilizing waterline of communication along the river Keonoi, and negotiations were made for the procurement of barges in large quantities.

(b) As the construction work progressed, the South Army sent two motorcar companies and 300 supply motor trucks and increased motor repair corps (two corps five sections).

N.B. There were no considerable reserve units at that time, and measures were taken for employing war materials in store for use by groups operating in isolated islands.

(c) Plans were made for pushing forward the head of heavy construction train, and on the Thai side, efforts were centered round the spot 90 kilometres from the starting point for cutting through cliffs, and plans were made for the preparation of pushing supply base as far forward as Wanyai (125 kilometres from the starting point). In Burma area, the head of heavy construction train was pushed forward 18 km from the starting point).

(d) Pushing supply point forward.

On the Thai side, a branch office of the freight depot was pushed forward from 'Panpon' area to Kanchanaburi; which was a march of 50 km into the construction area. On the Burma side, supply points were pushed forward from Rangun area to Moumein area.

3. The above-mentioned counter-measures were put into execution as follows, accompanied by such results as are stated below and influenced by the rainy season:

(a) The hurriedly constructed parallel motor road was completed on 5th April 1943, but on the Thai side, it was nothing more than an improvement of packhorse way with many curves, upon which motortrucks ran at an average speed of about 10 km per hour with an average maximum loading capacity of 1 ton (average -- about 500 kg.)

The main part of the newly delivered supply motor trucks (200 cars) were put into active use for only about twenty days before the rainy season set in, and only 40 % of these cars were fit for service, many of them often breaking down. Therefore, every effort was made for the supply of fixed rations, and attempts were made to pile up reserve stocks of provision and forage for use in the inner regions during the rainy season, but were not successful. During this period there was no great difficulty in the supply of staple ration, although a certain quantity of supplementary rations were lacking in the inner regions.

The motor trucks were sent there too late; the construction of the motor road was not complete within the appointed time; during the dry season, the road was in active use only for a short time; there was a shortage in transportation capacity; these were the main causes for the lack of rations above-mentioned.

On the Burma side, the road constructed parallel with the railway was comparatively well prepared, and as a whole, there was no difficulty for supply during the dry season.

(b) On the side of Thailand, the head of the heavy construction train reached Wanyai (125 km. from the starting point) about the middle of May, but the rainy season set in May, and the road bed was broken in many places. In July the River Keonoi overflowed its banks, the railway was flooded between Zanchangburi and Panpon and trains on the newly constructed line were held up for about twenty days. The stretching work further than Wanyai made but little progress hindered by the difficulty of rock-clearing. On the Burma side, the head of the heavy construction train reached the spot about 40 km. from the starting point by the middle of April, but during the rainy season, it was difficult to stretch the railway of the heavy construction train on account of the soft and weak road bed.

(c) Thus, the supply was comparatively easy during the dry season, but as soon as the rainy season set in, the roads both in Thailand and Burma were full of mud with marshy places here and there, which permitted no motor-car traffic, while the waters in the rivers did not rise rapidly. For a month (in May), through traffic both on land and water was held up, the supply was cut short, and those stationed in the inner regions -- 100 km. along the line, had to be contented with half or one third of the supply of fixed rations.

But with the rising of waters in the River Keonoi since June, land traffic was superseded by water traffic, the water line of communications was stretched, and by the end of July, establishment of the water line of communications was completed between Panpon and Niike (270 km); on the other hand, the Government of Thailand was urged to offer ships; from March on, ships were gradually gathered together and by the end of July more than 700 tugboats and 1200 lighters were secured, by which critical situation of supply could be entirely swept away.

During this period, the activities in the upper rapids of the Water Transportation Corps of the Imperial Guard Engineer Regiment, the activities on the water of the personnel from the company serving on land and from the motor car company, the efforts of the line of communication troops in the unified employment of these activities, together with the water transportation supply carried out by the internment camp itself, enabled to discharge the duties of supply work during the rainy season.

(d) During the time when transportation and communication both on land and on water had been suspended, shortage of supply was locally covered by sending and receiving stocks accumulated in various parts of the inner regions. Special consideration was given to the daily food especially the side dishes, of the prisoners of war, and from the middle of May on, herds of cattle were driven by land into the inner regions every several days. This was successful and nearly one thousand of cattle were secured on the Thai side alone.



(e) On the Burma side, where there were no waterways available, supply had been going on smoothly until the middle of April, but with the rainy season setting in about that time, its influence was considerable, and in June, railway bridges and road bridges on the Mezari and Winyau were swept away. The working troops concentrated their efforts on relay intercommunication and maintenance of the road, held to the line of supply desperately and could barely continue supply, but near Niike in the inner regions motor trucks broke down one after another, the supply was suspended and some of the troops were withdrawn from that region. But with the rising of waters, waterline of communications was stretched from the side of Thailand and in July, supply could be made as far as Niike.

(f) As is evident from the above-mentioned circumstances, difficulty of transportation in supply arose from the influence of the rainy season, and distress existed in various parts of the inner regions. All the Japanese working troops and a little less than one third of the prisoners of war were suffering from the influence. Details of supply for the prisoners of war are given below.

(g) Japanese army stationed in Thailand and Burma Army Group were responsible for supply to the internment camps, but since the establishment of line of communications early in April 1943, the task of supplying provisions was assigned to the railway unit.

In supplying provisions to the prisoners of war, special attention was paid for allotting fixed rations in accordance with various prescriptions of the law, and at the beginning of 1943 an addition of 50 gr. in the supply of both staple food and supplementary rations was decided upon by the South Army. Furthermore, provisions were revised and several times the amount of the fixed rations for the POW's was increased on account of their being engaged in heavy labor.

(h) As is mentioned above, the branch internment camps situated innermost regions suffered from shortage of rations in the same degree as the Japanese soldiers during the rainy season. In order to facilitate the supply work at the ends, executed by the internees themselves, the construction party delivered 30 motor trucks and scores of boats successive since the latter part of March 1943.

Besides this, the internment camp had about 50 motor trucks and about the same number of boats, and was actively engaged in transporting supplies.

(i) Acquisition in large quantity of supplementary rations, especially vegetables, was difficult, and during the dry season they were liable to be spoiled while they were being carried a long distance; while during the rainy season, they were always lacking owing to the difficulty of transportation. To cope with these situations, a great effort was made to encourage growing of vegetables so as to be able to do without the supply of supplementary rations, and considerable results were obtained in this way. Fishing in the River Keonoi had to be prohibited for a long time (from May to September) as cholera was prevailing along its banks, which was a great hindrance to better nourishment.



(j) Articles of luxury for internees (butter, cheese, sugar, coffee, black tea, etc.) were specially supplied by the South Army.

(k) Spare suits of clothes were supplied by the South Army, but were not by any means enough.

(l) The difficulties of supply work during the rainy season were as above-stated. Enemy counter-attacks in Burma with the end of the rainy season could clearly be foreseen. Therefore, an army group en route to Burma (two divisions, part of troops under direct control of the Army, individual soldier and civilian employee) marched along the railway under construction from April to September 1943. It was natural that the construction troops assisted them with munitions and there occurred no small shortage in the store of provisions.

To sum up, under the circumstances in that period, billeting and supply could not be anything but unsatisfactory, and both Japanese army and prisoners of war were obliged to endure hardships and privations.

## (II) Billeting.

1. Billeting facilities in Thailand were somewhat different from those in Burma.

On the Thai side, the working party had the advantage of utilizing the watercourse for supply during the rainy season, and employed the method of deploying on the whole line and of working all along the line simultaneously; curtailment of the construction period, however, necessitated quick deployment in the inner regions, and there was no time to build enough cottages (a kind of hut made of bamboo poles and 'chaku' — roofplant — called nipper-house) to billet the working party. Tents were generally used, only key points of construction having billeting facilities. The South Army, therefore, issued almost all the campaign tents on hand to the construction party, to accommodate nearly fifty thousand men, and afterwards ten odd thousand for supplementary use.

2. On the Burma side, consideration had from the outset been given to the supply work during the rainy season, and method of working from the ends had been taken in order to steadily push forward working sectors by gradually establishing supply from the starting point. Groups of billeting huts (nipper-houses) were built at intervals of from 5 to 10 km, tents being sometimes used for carrying about during movements.

3. The POW's in the Internment Camp, following the example of the construction party, built huts by themselves, and the construction party cooperated with them when necessary. Considerable working personnel were allotted for the work of the Internment Camp itself and for the improvement of its supervision and maintenance. (cf. Attached Table I)

4. Since May, after the setting-in of the rainy season, camp life proved defective: a wet pit was especially unwholesome; every effort was made to raise floors and spoiled beddings were exchanged for new ones. At the same time, nipper-houses gradually took the place of tents. Only bamboo poles could be obtained on the spot, roof-plant (chaku) being imported from other districts.

But the supply of chaku was not sufficient owing to the difficulties of securing and transporting them in large quantities. Thus, nipper-houses were built almost everywhere excepting the inner regions about 100 km. along the line of construction. But even those nipper-houses were not complete to bear the heavy rain coming down every day.

5. In order to accommodate the marching troops, (into Burma) preparation were made for arranging resting places with tents (standard capacity 250 men) and billeting areas (standard capacity 500 men) were almost completed early in May.

These facilities were utilized by the working party and the prisoners while they were shifting places within the construction area.

### (III) Sanitary arrangements.

#### 1. Outline of Medical service.

1. Taking into consideration the characteristics of this construction work area, preservation of health of the working party was a matter of greatest concern, success of this railway construction depending upon it. The South Army, therefore, attached greatest importance to the service of sanitation, and, following the example of building a canal at Panama, made reinforcement in sanitary organization. The main body of the South Army Epidemic Prevention and Water Supply Corps, which was the only standing epidemic prevention water supply corps throughout the South Area, was allotted the duties of service of sanitation; at the same time almost all the sanitary organizations under the direct control of the South Army were exhaustively concentrated and were placed under the control of the Director of Railway Construction.

Moreover, necessary medical service corps were extracted from the army corps engaged in first line operations and were allotted to the medical organization. Considering the situation of the general operations at that time, this effort can never be underestimated.

2. In taking care of the health of the prisoners of war, the system of the supervising organization of prisoners of war was mainly followed, and about 900 medical personnel of the Allied captives and some of the Japanese medical personnel were engaged in the service. About fifty-five invalids were in charge of one medical personnel, and this ratio was high compared with those of Japanese army (200 cases to one medical personnel attached to a unit) and ordinary working party

(200-300 cases to one medical personnel). But the composition of sanitary corps belonging to the Internee camp was not suited to field maneuverability and could not be made to display its ability to the full.

3. At the outset, the Thai Internment Camp was in cooperating relationship with the construction party, and the service of sanitation was being carried out by the corps itself, Japanese medical corps going to its assistance when necessary. But there arose the necessity of intensifying the general control of the medical service, and in July, 1943 this camp was placed under the control of the Director of Construction, after which unification of medical service was realized, resulting in the innovation of medical activities.

4. The organization of the Railway Medical Corps, South Army, is as is shown in Attached Paper IV.

On the Burma side, medical services were carried out by the medical organs belonging to the Burma Area Army, under the superintendence of the Railway Medical Corps, South Army.

Table of Railway Medical Corps, South Army.

Chief of the Medical Corps -- Colonel Kitagawa, A.M.C. (succeeded by Colonel Hayama, A.M.C. after killed on the field).

Main body of the South Army Epidemic Prevention Water supply Corps.

2nd Division Field Hospital (Transferred from Shonan)  
 ( " " Malay)  
 21st Division Field Hospital ( " " French Indo-China)  
 16th Line of Communication Hospital (Transferred from Burma)  
 56th Division Field Hospital (Transferred from Burma)  
 Part of each of 31st Division Epidemic Prevention Water Supply and Medical Corps. (Passing Army Group)  
 Part of each of 2nd Division Epidemic Prevention Water Supply and Medical Corps (Transferred from Malay)  
 54th Division Field Hospital (Passing Division)  
 16th Sick Transportation Section (Transferred from Thailand)  
 Other medical personnel belonging to railway units and line of communication area troops.  
 Prisoners of war Medical Service Personnel (special organization) co-operated by  
 Local Laborer's Medical Corps  
 2nd Army Hospital, South Army (Bangkok)

5. Why there was a difference in the number of casualties between the POW's and Japanese Army.

(a) Japanese army, especially railway units, were only about 4,000 in number, even when two regiments were put together. Naturally enough they were employed mainly for supervision of construction work and in the delicate technical work, POW's being mainly engaged in usual tasks.



The result was that the decline of physical strength on the part of the Japanese army was not so remarkable as in the case of the prisoners of war; this is why some differences is noticed in the figures indicating the results of medical activities under the same conditions.

(b) Compared with the Japanese, prisoners of war were not so well accustomed to the primitive life and had less power of resistance.

(c) Many cases of tropical ulcer occurred on account of their dress (knee-breeches), which accelerated their decline of physical strength.

6. The number of the deaths among the POW's, Japanese army and laborers are approximately as follows:

	Total	Deaths
POW's . . . . .	about 50,000	about 10,000(20%)
Japanese Army. . . . .	about 15,000	about 1,000(7%)
Laborers . . . . .	about 100,000	about 30,000(30%) (fugitives include

7. Colonel Mitagawa, Chief of the South Army Railway Medical Corps, was killed by an aeroplane accident while actively engaged in making arrangements for the supply of medical materials.

#### 1. Outbreak of cases and its counter-measures.

##### (a) How malnutrition occurred.

In november 1942, after the prisoners of war had begun their work, members of the South Army Medical Corps were despatched to the scene of their activity in order to inspect and further improve their treatment in respect of supply and maintenance. Increase of fixed rations was made (50 gr. both in staple food and meat) and additional mosquito-nets and blankets were delivered. But since the setting-in of the rainy season, in May 1943, traffic was sometimes suspended, and in the inner regions fixed rations had to be reduced by half, while the construction work was forcibly carried on. The work made such rapid progress that the workers had no leisure; either time or material was not found enough to complete billeting facilities and sanitary conditions were anything but satisfactory.

Under such unfavorable conditions, and as a result of forced work, since the middle of 1943 decline of the physical strength of the POW's was conspicuous, many cases of malnutrition appeared and the number of deaths increased. Therefore, serious cases were gradually transferred to the vicinity of Bangkok to receive treatment. Those who were in a stage of convalescence were assembled near Kanchanaburi, given small work and were allowed to recuperate there. For the rest, less amount of work was allotted, as much ration as possible was provided and every effort was made to restore their physical strength. Thus in 1944, they gradually regained their physical strength and the number of deaths dwindled.



## 2. How Cholera broke out.

Prevention of acute infectious diseases, together with precautions against malaria, was a most pains-taking task, and in order to prevent infection through water all the sanitation water filters available by the South Army were assembled in this construction area and they numbered 454 (including 7 motor-car filters).

Epidemic Prevention Water Supply Section composed of one Allied medical officer and four non-commissioned medical officers and privates, equipped with a set of sanitation water filter (B or C) and considerable amount of epidemic prevention and emergency sanitary materials, were allotted to every working company of the Prisoners of War and every necessary measure was taken for prevention, medical examination and attendance. The headquarters of the medical corps was at Kanchanaburi, and was active in coaching the prevention, in the examination and disinfection of bacteria and in other precautions.

Every one of those who were going to the construction area, was inoculated against cholera.

Cases of cholera first broke out among the local laborers on the side of Burma in November 1942, and in spite of desperate effort to check it, cases spread into Thailand across the frontier in April, 1943.

At the time of its outbreak, the number of cases among the natives swelled and shrunk with alternating intervals until at last, since May, there broke out cases among the Japanese and POW's. Therefore, the South Army often dispatched medical personnel to the scene to coach prevention. Every working party and sanitary organ did its best in prevention activities, sometimes entirely suspending construction work. At last, by the end of July, the plague quieted down except in some quarters. Although more cases broke out afterwards, they gradually dwindled away and in October completely died down. In June staffs of the medical Bureau in the War Department were dispatched to the scene.

Outbreaks of cases by the end of June 1943 are as follows:

1st Period	Nov.- Dec. 1943	43
2nd Period	Feb.-Mar. 1943	48
3rd Period	Apr.-May. 1943	586
4th Period	June 3rd - June 30th, 1943	<u>2046</u>
TOTAL		2723

The grand total by August 10 was about 6,000, of which about 4,000 died. Among these figures, about 1,200 are the cases of prisoners and it is our greatest regret that about half of them never survived.

The main causes of such raging were:

- (1) Fugitives among the native laborers suffering from cholera dispersed bacteria.
- (2) Cases broke out on the upper reaches of the River Keonoi and infected the construction work area.
- (3) Imperfect prevention instruction on the part of civilian employee in charge of the POW's, who was poor in the knowledge and ability and inferior in the quality.
- (4) Difficulty of supplying epidemic prevention materials due to pressed transportation.

It was largely due to the activities of the Sanitary Organs that the epidemic died down in comparatively short period and that great bursting out could be prevented, in spite of the unfavorable conditions under which they had been placed.

### 3. How cases of malaria occurred.

Greatest emphasis was laid on the prevention of malaria in the service of sanitation. Malaria prevention party was organized (composed of 341 officers and men, allotted at the ratio of one party to 5,000 laborers) and allotted to each unit, and was controlled by the South Army Epidemic Prevention Water Supply Corps; every possible science and technique was put into active use by them.

The following five items were measures of prevention.

- (a) To give complete knowledge and training of malaria prevention.
- (b) To prevent biting of mosquitoes, to prepare mosquito-nets and clothing, to fumigate.
- (c) To prevent the breeding of mosquitoes and to exterminate them, drainage, oil-sprinkling, cleaning, etc.
- (d) To take 45 dozes of sulphur-quinine and 3 dozes of "Flesmohin" internally per capita per month; every Japanese, prisoner and native laborer is required to take the same quantity.
- (e) Early discovery and separation of the case and keeper of "malaria protozoan";

Doctor Kimura, Professor in the Research Institution of Tropical Medicine, authority on malaria-prevention, came to the assistance of this service as a non-regular member of the staff of the South Army.

The ratio per month of malaria cases occurring during this construction work is as follows:

Japanese Army	1-7%
Prisoners of War	0-11%
Local laborers	10-20%

N.B. The ratio per month of malaria cases occurring in New Guinea area rose to about 20%

As is shown above, the ratio of malaria cases occurring among the Japanese army is comparatively low, but by the end of the construction period, the ratio of the keepers of malaria protozoan among the Japanese had risen to nearly 100%, and only by internal use of doses could some of the units prevent the attack of malaria. Generally speaking, the ratio of cases per month was about 4% throughout the Japanese and prisoners of war, which was a rather favorable indication compared with those of other theatres of war, and we may conclude that satisfactory results were obtained from the preventive measures.

#### 4. Tropical Ulcer

Tropical ulcer which was prevalent among prisoners of war was incurable and we found difficulty in its remedy. As a precautional measure, we made war prisoners put on leggings made of bamboo and had them wear boots. As a remedy permanganic acid salvarsan were used. In addition to these measures, each unit made ointment from lard by itself, and used it.

Inert skin, bare legs and insufficient auxiliary medicine such as disinfectant due to inexperience of the Japanese Army etc. were the reasons why this disease was prevalent especially among prisoners of war. Though we despatched medical veterans to the infected districts and made them study it, a complete remedy could not be found because of inexperience of the Japanese Army.

#### 5. Other prevailing diseases.

Generally speaking, coupled with malnutrition, many cases of dysentery, beriberi and gastroenteric disorder occurred. Pestilence and smallpox against which great precautions were taken broke out fortunately only a little at the beginning of 1943.

As above mentioned, various diseases were so prevalent that the percentage of the war prisoners in service was from sixty to seventy per cent in the average. But it fell to forty percent in the innermost and most unhealthy areas. On the contrary about eighty per cent was maintained in good controlled and healthy areas. Of about fifty thousand war prisoners, about three thousand were in hospital on 8th, July, 1943.

(6) State of occurrence of war prisoner cases is shown in Annex 2 and :

#### 3. Supply of medical supplies.

The South Army layed great stress on supply of medical supplies to these construction units and tried to prepare abundant malaria medicine and materials for epidemic prevention. Though quinine which was produced in Java was sufficiently supplied and materials for epidemic prevention, especially sanitary water-filters, were nearly sufficient, the South Army suffered from shortage of medical supplies in general, as the other medical supplies were all transported from the home islands and quantity supplied from the central office to the South Army was about 50,000 boxes



(about 1700t) in 1943 and about a half of 1943 in 1944, of which 20 per cent were lost as result of sinkings. The Bangkok Field goods Depot eagerly endeavored to supply the construction units: nevertheless it could not supply in so large quantity as was expected because of insufficient stocks and difficulty of transportation. The South Army ordered that ratio of supply to the war prisoners and to the Japanese troops should be equal.

4. To sum up, we took every measure possible under the circumstances and did our best to maintain the health of the prisoners of war. The main reasons why such a miserable result was brought about in spite of our efforts are as follows:

(1) As a result of the forced construction work, various defects were brewed. Especially, the work was commenced without sufficient sanitary arrangements.

(3) In addition to bad conditions of the roads, traffic during the rainy season was tied up, so that supply was very difficult and the standard of ration fell down.

(4) Mixing of the native laborers who had no knowledge of sanitation disturbed sanitary tasks.

5. Main body of foremen were Koreans and their supervision was not proper. Accordingly, hygiene could not be thorough.

It is quite regretful that in spite of all the sanitary measures, many defects were brewed and many invalids and deaths occurred.

### Chap.III Outline of the Supervision and Employment of the Prisoners of War.

#### Sect.I How the War Prisoners became to be employed.

1. It is natural that the labor which is primary constituent of this building requires an enormous number of the assistant workers, in addition to the troops. Therefore, though the local laborers (Thailanders, Malaysians, Burmese, Chinese, Javanese, Annamese) were raised, it was very difficult to get a large number of laborers without delay, on account of various circumstances, and moreover, those natives who are inferior in their physical conditions and ability could not be made the leading part of the labor for this construction which ought to be completed in a short time.

2. Hereupon the South General Army requested the sanction of the General Headquarters concerning the employment of the war prisoners. The General Headquarters sanctioned the employment of the war prisoners, because this construction was partly a work to be done far from the front, and partly bore the mission of the trade route between Thailand and Burma.



At that time the Army, as a whole, had a view that it is not against the Geneva Treaty on the War Prisoners to employ the prisoners of war in such a work.

3. Consequent to the sanction, in the beginning of the preparation for construction, the South Army ordered the railway troops to supervise a part of prisoners of war and to engage them in the preparation work. After that, subsequent to the organization of the Thailand camp, the South General Army made those of the camp be engaged in the construction work under their control.

4. And after the considerable progress of the construction, especially as it became more and more indispensable to increase the labor, because the term for the construction was shortened, a great number of war prisoners in Java, Borneo, Singapore and Indo-China were transmitted to the Thailand Camp and newly two branches of the Malay Camp were attached to the commander of the construction troops.

5. The prisoners of war in the above paragraphs were transported, those on Thailand side by railway, those on Burma by ships respectively, to the construction area, while their removals within the construction area were done on foot. The details about this transportation will be shown in Chapter V, "Explanation for the Protests".

#### Sect. II Relations between the Supervising party and Employing Party.

1. Outline of the supervision of prisoners of war and their missions to construct the railway is seen in the annexed paper, III, above.

2. After the Thailand Camp was organized, (August, 1942), it was designed to cooperate with the construction troops about for a year since July, 1943.

3. The delay in the progress of the work owing to the increase of patients due to the influence of the weather and climate made necessary still closer relation between the working troops and the camp, regarding the improvement of supply and sanitation, as well as the working capacity. till at last in July, 1943, the Thailand camp was put under the command of the construction commander. However, a part of war prisoners located on Burma side, (two branches, with about 15,000 prisoners) was since July, 1943 put under the command of the commander of the 5th railway regiment, who was concurrently the commander of the construction work in that area, by the reason of the difficulty of liaison, the remoteness and the inconvenience of supply. But as to the supervision of the war prisoners in the proper sense, they were under the control of the head of the Thailand Camp. Except in the Burma area, the camps were under the direct management of the construction commanders, but were never put under the direct control of the working troops.

4. The fact that two branches of the Malay Camp were set up in May, 1943, and put under the control of the construction commander was described in the above paragraphs.

5. On the employment of prisoners of war, they were not attached separately to working troops on the spot. As regards employing them on the spot, the branch leaders of the camps and the commanders of battalions and companies negotiated together and regulated the working hours of employed members. That means that, after the camps were put under the control of construction commanders, the camps delivered the required number of persons to the required places in accordance with the orders of the construction commanders, who were not entitled to interfere in the business of supervision itself, according to the above mentioned method of employment, and the construction troops cooperated in improvement of the supervision as far as their circumstances permitted.

6. When some of prisoners of war who have a special ability were to be temporarily detached, they were attached along with the supervising personnel after the negotiation between the camps and the employing parties. For instances, some were employed as chauffeurs for the commissary troops or as technical men for the material depots.

7. Subsequent to the progress of the work, a special attention was paid at the time of the moving forward of the camps. Their removals were limited only within a small range so that the waste time and the unnecessary establishments might be saved as far as possible. Since August, they were ordered to remove only when the accommodations and food staffs had been completely prepared.

8. As is mentioned above, the close relation was kept on between the supervision party and the employing party, and much attention was paid to the prisoner's health and a special effort was made to improve the situation of supervision on the basis of their customs and manners. This can be seen from many instructions rendered by the commanders of the camps to their men and those rendered on the part of embarkation to the prisoners to be transported, on the occasion of their transportation to the home-land.

### Sect. III. Outline of supervision and service.

1. The Thailand Camp completed its organization at Bangkok in the middle of August, 1942. At its opening, the number of the prisoners of war was about 3,000, and they were put into service in the preparation work of each troop located at the bases for the railway construction. After that, from October of the same year to March, 1943, the war prisoners, 50,637 in all (including the dead) were transferred several times to Bangkok and Moulmein from the Malay and Java camps, and the most of them (38,000) were caused to cooperate with the 9th railway regiment whose mission was to work on the Thailand side, while some of them cooperated with the 5th regiment whose mission was to work on the Burma side.

2. Subsequently, in April, 1943, to accelerate the construction work more, two branches of the Malay Camp (about 10,000 war prisoners) were despatched and cooperated in this work, deploying near Mike and Kinsaiyork.

3. At the beginning, the equipments of the camps were in so poor state that they had no vehicle, and the lorries for the construction troops were used at the same time for the sake of supplying. For that reason, the war prisoners to be transferred were obliged to march on foot, to deploy in the remote places, walking a long distance under the burning sunshine.

On their arrival the destination, a little more than 30% fell ill, and in addition to that, the insufficient accommodations and the unsteady supplies by reason of the bad condition of the transportation route, accelerated the increase of patients.

4. In May, 1943, the track was opened to Wanyai, Thailand (at 120 kilometres from the starting point) while in Burma, the head of the upper construction of the track was toward the vicinity of Anakwin (at 40 kilometres from the starting point). However, as mentioned above, as the rain season set in about one month earlier, and because of the enormousness of rainfall, the transportation of supply did not go as it was intended.

As in remote places, the ration of food stuff was sometimes reduced to a half or one third by the above reason and the temperature was low, there broke out a sudden consumption of energy. But the work was still continued in accordance with the order which commanded to finish it by the end of August working in the rain, the supervision of the war prisoners fell unproper. As a result, many patients came out; above all, as unexpectedly cholera became prevalent and cases of tropic ulcer increased, the service rate extremely lowered.

5. At the end of June, cholera broke out in some working troops, and as it threatened to spread over, still more surgeons, medical non-commissioned officers and privates of the war prisoners, 230 in all, were attached to the railway troops from the Malay camp and charged to check the disease.

6. In September, when the rainy season was over, the condition of roads became better, and also in addition to the advance of the head of the upper construction of tracks, the concurrent employment of the water-route of the Keonoi River became possible. Therefore as the transportation of supply got better, the regular ration could be given with the aid of the commissary troops and by the great effort of the transportation section of the troops. However, owing to the fatigues accumulated within more than one year past, and the deployment in the remote places insufficiently equipped with the sanitary arrangements, the number of patients and the deceased did not shrink.

7. After the completion of the work in October, 1943, the Thailand camp despatched 1,000 healthy prisoners alternatively from the flat country to the remote places and caused them engage in the reinforcement work of the railway; and at the same time, successively transferred and collected this



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main body over the level ground, and endeavored especially to recover the health of the prisoners. The supervision, too, became normal.

Especially many camps were established in the rendezvous, such as Panpon Kanchanaburi and a camp hospital was built at the cost of 1,500,000 yen at Nakonpaton. Besides making such a great effort to give medical treatment to the patients, the supplies were given beyond the regular ration.

So the health condition of the prisoners got better step by step and the number of patients and the dead dwindled.

The two branches of the Malay camp were restored successively to their proper positions by the end of that year and their health condition also recovered.

8. The disposition of the Thailand camp will be shown in the annexed Chart I.

9. An outline of the services of the prisoners and the list of patients and the dead during the construction work can be seen in the annexed Table I and VIII.

NOTE -- To improve the supervision, the camp organized transportation and supply sections and accommodation, building, and special medical sections and so on; and made effort to eliminate inadequate circumstances, allotting a considerable personnel.

(See Table I.)

#### Chap. IV. Disgraceful Affairs during the construction work.

##### Sect. I. Insults upon corpse.

1. On a day in June, 1943, there broke out a case that Lieut. Fujii Kiyoshi, commander of the second company of the 9th Railway Regiment, ordered one of the war prisoners to shoot his fellow who was suffering from cholera (dead) in consideration of checking the disease.

2. He was brought to trial in the court martial of the Thailand Occupation Army, but was acquitted of. As for himself, the commander of his own troops gave him a maximum punishment for his improper treatment.

The Army Department suspended him from office and relieved of his post, causing him to return to the home land.

3. The railway construction commander disciplined the commander of the 9th Railway Regiment to which Fujii belonged.

4. The details are not certain, as the documents were burnt down.

Sect. II. Other Affairs.

1. Concerning any other affairs than that in Sect. I. it is quite difficult for the central authority to search into them. It is desired the local authorities be investigated.

But there was not such a case as 600 men were pushed down to death from a precipice.

Chap. V. Explanations on some special items in relation to the protests of the Allied Powers.

Sect I. On the treatment of war prisoners during the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway.

1. Gist.

As for the treatment of war prisoners during the preparatory course and construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway, it will become clear when the circumstances and the actual state of affairs at that time are understood, namely, though the greatest effort at that time was made under the above mentioned circumstances, many fell unavoidable victims.

Further explanations, apart from the above circumstances, about the transportations to and the marching within the construction area will be given hereafter.

2. Railway transportations.

a. Railway transportation of the war prisoners in Thailand, and Malay at the time of the construction work.

The transportation capacity required from the viewpoint of the operation and military administration ran short conspicuously, while about 3,500 cars possessed in Malay were reduced to about 1,700 usable cars by extreme decadence and the means of communication was in a very poor state, and various kind of cars of French Indo-China, Thailand, Malay, and Japan were used mixedly. As a result, they had hard work to draw up a transportation plan and to manage the cars. The 3rd Field Railway Headquarters took charge of the planning and managing of the railway transportation, basing on the south army Ordinance on the management of the railway transportation. In the transportation of the persons, it was not unusual that one train was limited to take 700 persons on board (25 carriages, with 28 persons per carriage) in Malay-Southern Thailand line - Puenben(7).

This standard was adopted indiscriminately for the war prisoners and the native laborers as well.

The cars used consisted of five uncovered waggons which were used to put on brake (LS) and other covered ones (CG). These were mainly cars transporting rice from Thailand to Malay and coming back with no load.)



The transportation of war prisoners was as a whole carried out on this organization. It was owing to such a situation that even Japanese officers as a rule were taken on board the waggons at that time. But in some places there might have been some instances where the rate of covered and uncovered waggons in organizations was subject to a slight alternation in accordance with the car situation at the time or more persons than the full capacity were forced to be taken on board.

Note The Management of the cars at that time is as follows:

1. Shingapore -- Bangkok: Two trains 10 days x 25 cars x 2 trains = 500
  2. Punonpen -- Northern District: One train 15 days x 25 cars x 1 train = 375 cars
  3. Shingapore--Kura Isthmus terminus: One train 8 days x 25 cars x 1 train = 200 cars
  4. Shingapore--Awalsta: Coal train Fifteen trains 6 days x 25 cars x 1 train = 225 cars
  5. Local military train: One train 6 days x 25 cars x 1 train = 150 cars.
- TOTAL - - - - - 1,600 cars

When a necessity for special trains besides these ordinary ones occurred or an incident broke out, the want of cars was felt intensely, and so above mentioned condensed transportation was indispensable on the railway line within an area where an operation was constantly carried out.

## 2. Supply and sanitation during the transportation.

As for the supply, the staple food was received from the Army in agreement with the South General Army Intendence Ordinance, the side dishes were served after the menu was drawn up. The actual condition was regularly reported to the Army.

The side dishes of fixed quantity were acquired with great pains from all over Thailand, Malay, and French Indo-China and a great effort was made to improve the menu.

Regards to the sanitation during the transportation, an overseer sent from a prisoner camp took charge of it and it was ordered that he would act in concert with medical institutions concerned through a commander of the nearest station. As the actual instances show, the commander paid a special attention to keeping up such prisoner's health as it was on his arrival, and inspected the management of transportation of prisoners at the station, and issued orders carefully about the supply, sanitation and treatment.

### 3. Transportation by ships.

1. Since the beginning of the war, Japan lost rapidly as it is known a large number of vessels.

2. The counter-measures for the want of vessels and the conditions of transportations were as follows.

#### A. Counter-measure of transportation.

i. From the beginning to the middle of 1942:  
Tonnage per head -- 5 gross tons.

ii. From about the middle to the end of 1942:  
Tonnage per head -- 2-15 gross tons.

iii. From about the beginning to the middle of 1943:  
Tonnage per head -- 1-2 gross tons.

iv. From about the middle of 1943:  
Tonnage per head -- 1 gross ton.

#### b. Transportation of automobiles and other weapons.

Since the middle of 1942, they were as a rule decomposed and transported.

About 70-80 gross tons were allotted for a whole lorry when it was to be transported, but about 20-30 gross tons was allotted for a decomposed one.

#### c. Transportation of horses.

i. From the beginning of the war to the middle of 1942.  
Tonnage per horse -- 10 gross tons.

ii. From the middle to the end of 1942.  
Tonnage per horse -- 9 gross tons

iii. Since 1943, it was made a rule that the horses were not transported on account of the want of vessels, though the transportation of them was indispensable for the operation.

#### NOTE

1. A horse cannot be dismembered to reduce the tonnage, as a lorry can.

2. A horse cannot be packed up as a person can be.

B. The situation of transportation. The condition of the closely packed carrying of the troops, owing to the rapid loss of vessels, can be understood through Note I. The instances are as follows:

a. One division which was to be transported to deploy in the central Pacific and consisted of about 15,000 men, about 200 automobiles and munitions of about 3 months (for example, the 29th Division) was transported by only three ships, each 8,000 or 10,000 gross tons in all (the Miiko-Maru 11,000 tons, the Yamato-Maru 7,900 tons, and the Kyozan-Maru 8,600 tons).

b. Further in a case of a transportation to be deployed in the Central Pacific, about 8,000 men, about 80 automobiles and other munitions were carried from Luzon, Yokocho to Guam in a vessel of 6,000 gross tons (the Yamato-Maru, with additional 350 "tsubo"s accommodation).

c. In the Southern districts (for example, the Fugo-Maru, 1,900 gross tons, which were vessels allotted to the transportation from Singapore to Bangkok,) the vessel was made the best use of, by rationing banana and so on as a sustenance to avoid cooking in a ship. Such sort of transportation was called a "Banana" transportation. In a "Banana" transportation, the actual situation was about 29 men per "tsubo", when the whole of men on board is divided by all "Tsubo" of berths.

d. The equipments for transportation of personnel are as follows

1. Setting aside indisposible vessels, all were two storied. Still further in every spare room on the decks, two or three storied berths were equipped as it was called the "Decisive battle transportation". Thus the capacity was increased.

2. The space between the upper and the lower stories was regulated not to touch the head in sitting attitude (about 0,75 metre in minimum.)

3. As the capacity was increased as far as possible, with an equipment of such berths as said in 1 and 2, each person lost the freedom of his action in a ship when the ship was damaged by a torpedo and many persons and munitions were sunk to the bottoms of the sea.

This caused the greatest difficulty in the operation of the Japanese army and its fighting power of long duration. About this matter, it is supposed that your navy knows well.

The bad ventilation and the bad and inconstant supply and the loss of sleep (it was impossible to lie down) due to the closest packing caused the conspicuous increase of patients during the transportation.

Even those who did not fall ill during the transportations, must be at rest for a time after landing, or else, they sometimes became unable to fight a severe battle.

For that reason, the shipping space was calculated to economize as far as possible, the water-closet being put outside gunnel.



### C. Transportation of munitions

As the battle became severer and severer, the rapid production of airplanes was desired more and more. Therefore the transportation from the South of bauxite, and other materials indispensable for the rapid production of airplanes grew more necessary in its priority, on account of this.

a. The vessels for the South allotted to carry bauxite were decided to carry nothing but personnel on its outward passage to increase its frequency.

This matter checked very much the transportation of munitions to the troops in the South.

b. On its home passage from the South, bauxite was overloaded to such an extremity that the load-line was ignored.

The home-coming troops from the South and so on were taken on the decks or on the top of the munitions.

c. Instances of counter-measures for transportation and its actual conditions accompanying the want of vessels were as above mentioned. It is desired that you acknowledge the war prisoners were not closely packed up only because they were war prisoners.

That they were kept from coming out on the decks may be from the viewpoint of guarding and preventing of espionage of the voyage of ship groups.

It may be supposed that the war prisoners transported to the Thailand-Burma Railway area were treated better than in any other areas.

An instance of "Decisive battle" Equipment.

1. Two or three-storied equipments in boats. (boats were hung outside gunnel.) By this means, 15 to 20 "Tsubo" could be additionally increased in 5,000 gr. t. class ships.
2. Two-storied equipment on both sides of or in rear of the bridge. By this means 5 or 10 "tsubo" could be additionally increased.
3. Two-storied equipment of a half or almost all saloon. For example, in the Nissho-Maru, about 40 "tsubo" was additionally increased.
4. Two-storied equipment of the cabins. For example, in the Nissho-Maru, each cabin was equipped with two stories. The capacity of the cabins became about three times, as much as before.
5. A part of coal-bunker and a store-room was put in order and equipped with berths.

4. How two branches of the Malay camp were removed on foot within the construction area to the spot.

A. Outline

In May, 1943, to promote the work, two branches of the Malay camp were newly attached to the railway regiment. One of them was moved to Miike and the other to Kinsaiyork, being transported by railway from Shingapore to Panpon, from where they went on foot.

According to the circumstances at that time, it was the want of the transportation means that forced them to march on foot.

B. Then was just the time the deploy the forces and labor to the remote places accompanying the progress of the work. At the same time the only means of transportation, that is lorries, were scarce enough to be used for the supply, and rather they were some times in want. Therefore, they could not be used for the transportation of persons. Also the water-routes did not swell yet, so that the use of ships were restrained.

C. For that reason, the following action was taken to remove them on foot.

a. At the end of April, the commissary facilities were established along the line of construction, and they were used to give the aid in the accommodations and supplies.

At every 20 or 25 kilometres along the march line, a pavilion (camping by means of tent) was set up, with a tea supplying place in the interval.

b. The march was as a rule 20 or 25 kilometres a day and made by night to avoid the heat.

c. A great effort was made to check the epidemics on the marching road and stragglers were taken in to the nearest sanitary institution. For this means, motor cars were driven along in order to make liaison and to take stragglers in.

d. In consideration of the supply, an echelon was made up of 200 or 300 persons. It was made a rule that they should rest one day, when they marched two or three days.

D. And at that time, the 31st Division ("Retsu" Division) which were marching to Burma were all walking on foot from the middle of April in the same way as above.

E. In short, the marching on foot was not avoidable. if the circumstances were considered. Even a squadron on an urgent operation was, as it really was compelled to march more than 400 kilometres, and we assure that it was decidedly not only on the war prisoners that this was compelled.

Sect. II. On the treatment of war prisoners in Moulmein Area.

1. Gist.

Though researches about this matter have been made into every local authorities concerned from the end of 1944, the details are unknown, for the persons concerned at that time had almost all been dead or transferred, as a long time elapsed since then.

It can be considered that some contents of your protests have discrepancies in the period and the figure, and some are exaggerated and some are not founded.

In the following they will be explained on the ground of the data which are distinct at present.

2. About the report.

A. There is no fact that nearly 20,000 war prisoners were accommodated in Moulmein and its vicinity at the beginning of 1942.

B. In Moulmein and its vicinity, from March to June, 1942, about 120 prisoners of English officers, and about 700 Indian prisoners and in Tavoy 79 Indian prisoners who were interned together with hostile citizens were held.

The war prisoners in Moulmein and those in Tavoy were removed to Rangoon Field Camp (established on the 19th of March, 1942) in June, 1942 and in February 1943 respectively. (The above is the report from the Malay Camp.)

C. Nevertheless, it was decided that the war prisoners should be employed to make good the want of labor when the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway was discussed, and 9,535 prisoners from Java, and 1946 prisoners from Shingapore were removed to the vicinity of Tampizaya in Burma (about 50 kilometres south of Moulmein), in November 1942 and in January 1943 respectively.

D. And as they were composed into the Thailand Camp, it must have been reported relating to an opening place of the Thailand Camp.

3. State of Affairs.

A. The deceased while being accommodated before the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway were five Englishmen (one of them on account of the wound caused in the battle) and five Indians. (The above is a report of the Malay Camp.)

And as it was just at the beginning of Burma operation, and it was almost impossible to send the supply the rear, the collecting of materials on the spot was not carried out as it was desired. Consequently the supply may not have been enough, but the same was with the Japanese Army.



B. The number of the deceased prisoners in the district to the east of Tanbizaya after the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway was begun (about since October 1942), is as shown in the annexed Table VIII.

Even in all Burma to the west of Tanbizaya (at this time there was no prisoners in Moulmein) there was 10 deceased in October and 12 in November, 1942. It is unfounded that at that time so many were dead as in your protests.

C. As the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway was most urgent for the operation as mentioned beforehand, the work must be forced even with what materials and equipments the Japanese army had.

Moreover, the districts along the projected railway line were the jungle where no man had even trodden and the accommodations and supplies and sanitary facilities were quite different from the normal life of the war prisoners and the traffic was interrupted frequently during the rainy season of 1943.

On account of these causes, the war prisoners as well as the Japanese soldiers were obliged to suffer great pains.

Especially, though the main forces of the sanitary facilities of the Japanese army were concentrated to prevent the prevalence of malaria and disorders of the digestive system, they could not be checked.

Still more with the civilized prisoners unaccustomed to the wild life.

When the railway was opened in October 1943, every establishment and equipment were made complete and the number of the patients and the deceased remarkably dwindled.

As for the details, refer to the Chapters I and III.

#### 4. Display of the war prisoners.

A. There is no fact that the war prisoners were contemptuously displayed in February 1944 as your protests mention.

B. But it is not certified whether or not some of those who were engaged in the supplementary work were employed in order to transport the foodstuff and materials in the city of Moulmain after the completion of the construction of the Thailand-Burma Railway.

#### CONCLUSION

1. The foregoing is an explanation of the circumstances which compelled a heavy toll of life during the progress of the construction work. In the final analysis, causes of the tragedy may be traced principally to the placement of a time limit on the construction, the immense difficulty in making thorough preparation and to the precipitancy with which the Japanese soldiers, despite their lack of experience in such large-scale construction work and meagre scientific equipment, dared to carry on their

work in strict obedience to orders which they characteristically regarded as imperative. Thus the occurrence of the casualties, it must be declared, was by no means due to any deliberate intention on the part of the Army authorities.

As regards the employment of prisoners of war in the above construction work, it may be stated that at the time the Japanese Army as a whole entertained the ideas that the employment of prisoners of war in any work other than military operations was not a breach of the Geneva Convention. Furthermore, it is to be insisted that the incident was of a radically different character from the so-called maltreatment of prisoners of war.

2. The incident, already stated was an inevitable outcome of the situation then prevailing, and, if anyone is to be called to account for the dreadful death rate, the responsibility ought to be placed on the then Chief of the General Staff (General Sugiyama) who ordered the construction, the War Minister (General Tojo) who sanctioned the employment of prisoners, and the Commander-in-Chief of the South Area Corps (General Terauchi) who was entrusted with the construction on the spot.

3. As regards individual cases of maltreatment of prisoners of war, it is desired that investigation be started upon the further receipt from the Allied Powers of a report of the details, particularly the ranks, and names of the suspected offenders, and if as a result, they should be found guilty severe measures should be meted out to them.

End. No. 1

List of Monthly Statistics of Condition on Prisoner of War Management								
Month	Total Prisoners	Operation on Construction of Railway		Works in Branches		Number of Accidents		Rates of Number of Workers
		Number of Prisoners Worked	Rate to Total Number of Prisoners	Number of Prisoners Worked	Rate to Total Number of Prisoners	Patients	Rates to Total Number of Prisoners	to Total Number of Prisoners
1942								
Aug.	2.987	1.704	0.60	902	0.27	318	0.13	0.87
Sept.	2.987	1.304	0.44	1.222	0.40	463	0.16	0.84
Oct.	9.947	6.407	0.61	1.904	0.17	1.636	0.20	0.80
Nov.	23.176	10.983	0.48	5.125	0.22	6.021	0.30	0.70
Dec.	28.267	13.093	0.47	6.406	0.23	8.668	0.30	0.70
1943								
Jan	29.663	13.604	0.45	7.091	0.17	8.968	0.38	0.62
Feb	33.776	19.583	0.49	8.888	0.22	11.400	0.29	0.71
Mar	40.554	20.786	0.51	8.793	0.22	11.488	0.27	0.73
Aug	47.737	460.133		191.673		651.806		
Sept	45.873	453.660		156.570		610.230		
Oct	45.130	462.365		161.696		624.061		
	Total	6774959		2.494.133		9269.091		

1509



End. No. 1

List of Monthly Statistics of Condition on Prisoner of War Management								
Month	Total Prisoners	Operation on Construction of Railway		Works in Branches		Number of Accidents		Rates of Number of Workers
		Number of Prisoners Worked	Rate to Total Number of Prisoners	Number of Prisoners Worked	Rate to Total Number of Prisoners	Patients	Rates to Total Number of Prisoners	to Total Number of Prisoners
1942								
Aug.	2.987	1.704	0.60	902	0.27	318	0.13	0.87
Sept.	2.987	1.304	0.44	1.222	0.40	463	0.16	0.84
Oct.	9.947	6.407	0.61	1.904	0.17	1.636	0.20	0.80
Nov.	23.176	10.983	0.48	5.125	0.22	6.021	0.30	0.70
Dec.	28.267	13.093	0.47	6.406	0.23	8.668	0.30	0.70
1943								
Jan	29.663	13.604	0.45	7.091	0.17	8.968	0.38	0.62
Feb	33.776	19.583	0.49	8.888	0.22	11.400	0.29	0.71
Mar	40.554	20.786	0.51	8.793	0.22	11.488	0.27	0.73
Apr	45.113	24.103	0.53	7.491	0.16	13.923	0.31	0.69
May	47.922	24.401	0.51	7.765	0.17	15.683	0.32	0.68
June	45.858	20.774	0.43	4.492	0.19	21.616	0.38	0.62
Jul.	47.558	21.152	0.44	4.889	0.12	22.761	0.44	0.56
Aug.	47.737	14.843	0.27	6.183	0.13	27.053	0.58	0.42
Sept.	45.873	15.122	0.34	5.219	0.09	26.202	0.57	0.43
Oct.	45.130	14.915	0.33	5.216	0.12	24.999	0.55	0.45
Nov.	44.945	12.378	0.27	6.568	0.15	26.548	0.8	0.42
Note: These numbers show average of every other day since establishment of the camp, however, as far as November average by 25th.								

List of Monthly Statistics of Cumulative Number of Prisoners Worked

Month	Total Number	Operation on Railway	WORKS in Branches and Other Units	Total
1942				
Aug	2.987	52.834	27.962	80.786
Sept	2.987	39.120	36.660	75.780
Oct	9.947	198.617	59.024	257.641
Nov	23.176	329.490	153.750	483.240
Dec	28.167	405.883	198.586	604.469
1943				
Jan	29.663	421.724	219.821	641.545
Feb.	33.776	548.324	248.864	797.188
Mar.	40.554	644.366	272.583	916.949
Apr.	45.113	723.490	224.910	948.000
May	47.922	756.431	240.715	997.146
June	45.858	623.220	149.760	772.980
Jul.	47.558	655.712	151.559	807.271
Aug	47.737	460.133	191.673	651.806
Sept	45.873	453.660	156.570	610.230
Oct	45.130	462.365	161.696	624.061
	Total	6774959	2,494.133	9269.091

1509.

Encl. No. 2

1509

1. LIST of Kind of Prisoners of War's disease (in Thai) October 1943									
Kind of Disease	Old Patient	New Patient	Total	Days for Treatment	Recovered	Dead	Transferred	Remained	
1. Disease to Whole Body and Epidemic									
Cholera	8	1	9	77	8			1	
Dysentery	111	135	246	1,801	172	14	23	39	
Beriberi	1,421	1,189	2,509	30,356	977	38	852	1,146	
Diphtheria	3	2	5	162	1				
Malaria	2,049	3,377	5,426	63,693	2,698	79	656	1,973	
Paratyphoid		2	2	7	2				
Leptospirosis		9	9	181	9				
Pulmonary Tuberculosis	6	13	19	166	10	1	1	2	
Others	45	148	193	978	170	1		22	
2. Nervous Disease									
Mental Disease		3	3	17				1	
Others	15	17	32	364	42		2	4	
3. Respiratory Disease									
Pneumonia	8	9	17	201	7	4	1	5	
Pleurisy	5	5	10	105	8		2		
Others	401	613	1,014	6,326	763	5	17	230	
4. Heart Disease	78	134	212	1,495	161	3	5	40	
5. Digestive Disease									
Acute Stomach Catarrh	49	85	134	980	106		3	25	
Acute Intestine Catarrh	958	1,052	1,990	20,360	1,113	43	230	524	
Others	1,284	1,448	2,432	39,467	691	138	365	1,238	
6. Urinary and Genital Disease	36	50	86	791	61		5	20	
7. Venereal Disease									
8. Eye Disease	44	96	140	1,117	103		12	27	
9. Ear Disease	7	27	34	215	29			5	
10. Skin Disease									
Itch	285	407	692	6,277	508		7	177	
Others	230	907	1,319	8,730	1,021		120	196	
11. Athletic Disease									
Polio-myelitis and Joint Disease	32	71	106	671	75		3	28	
Paratyphoid	20	22	42	276	42			6	
Others	2	10	12	121	4	1	5	2	
12. External and Accidental Injury									
Hypodermis Sprinkle Laceration	15	117	134	775	96		4	34	
Hurt by Sprain & Laceration	259	533	787	8,172	604			183	
Fracture	16	13	29	282	16		9	4	
Sprain & Dislocation	8	10	13	124	5		2	5	
Others	86	347	435	3,236	237		111	85	
13. Others									
Self-Hurt Suicide & Murder									
Fatal Disease									
4. Kind of Disease Undivided	125	354	482	3,479	354		11	117	
Total	10,021	13,750	23,801	252,397	12,773	344	2,871	7,573	

Note:

Per day	Old Patient	New Patient	Total	Days for Treatment	Recovered	Dead
	3,233	4,445	7,678	81,080	4,120	111



Encl. No. 3

List of kind of prisoners of war's Disease		(in Burma) October 1943							
Names of Disease		Old Patient	New Patient	Total	Days for Treatment	Recovered	Dead	Trans- ferred	Remains
1. Disease to Whole Body and Epidem- ic	Cholera	1		1	12	1			
	Dysentary	541	277	818	14,579	331	62		725
	Malaria	1,390	2,017	3,407	44,273	1,950	24		1,503
	Influenza	147	858	1,005	6,295	784			221
	Beriberi	235	271	506	8,553	215	21		280
	Pelagra	271	138	409	6,382	236			183
	Poisoning	2	20	22	53	22			
Total		44	108		2,578	82			70
14. Kind of Disease under -code.		34	90		1,197	115			9
Total		5,996	7,417		189,660	7,455	162		5,716
Not:									

Per day

Old Patient	New Patient	Total	Days for Treatment	Recovered	Dead
1,934	2,392	4,327	61,181	2,405	52

Encl. No. 3

List of kind of prisoners of war's Disease		(in Burma) October 1943							
Names of Disease		Old Patient	New Patient	Total	Days for Treatment	Recovered	Dead	Transferred	Remained
1. Disease to whole Body and Epidemic	Cholera	1		1	12	1			
	Dysentary	541	297	838	14,579	331	62		425
	Malaria	1,390	2,017	3,407	44,273	1,950	24		1,503
	Influenza	147	858	1,005	6,295	784			221
	Beriberi	235	281	516	8,553	315	21		280
	Pelagra	281	128	409	6,382	236			183
	Poisoning	2	20	22	53	22			
2. Nervous Disease	Mental Disease	2	1	3	63		1		2
	Others	73	46	119	2,942	21	1		97
3. Respiratory Disease	Pneumonia	11	14	25	144	18	4		3
	Pleurisy		6	6	81	3			3
	Others	143	220	363	4,025	239	2		122
4. Heart Disease		75	40	115	2,028	44			91
5. Digestive Disease	Acute Stomach Catarrh	75	43	118	662	98			20
	Acute Intestinal Catarrh	248	433	681	8,967	439			262
	Others	423	624	1,047	12,877	558	4		485
6. Urinary/Gonorrhea Disease		43	31	74	1,316	27	1		46
7. Venereal Disease									
8. Eye Disease									
9. Ear Disease									

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10 skin disease	Itch	2	8	119	5	5
	Furuncle Carbuncle					
	Corrective					
	Tissue disease	1,401	1,530	4,126	1,504	7
	other					1417
11. Athletic disease	Periosteum & Joint disease, muscle	144	208	4,196	231	1
	Tendon or Mucous sack disease					120
	other					
12 External and accidental injury	Hypodermic sprain &	280	94	5,452	111	18
	Laceration					
	Fracture					
	sprain & dislocation	4	1	725	6	2
	Don - other					
	Hurt by sprain & fractured bone		75	4,913	107	11
	other		134	3,920	180	5
13 Others	Self-hurt, suicide & murder					
	Fake disease	44	108	2,578	82	70
14. Kind of disease under code.		34	90	1,197	115	9
Total		5,991	7,417	189,660	7,455	162
Not:						5716

Per day

Old Patient	New Patient	Total	Days for Treatment	Recovery	Dead
1934	2,392	4,327	61,181	2,405	52



Encl. No. 4

From Jan 1943 List Showing Monthly Reports (Reports from Prisoners)  
To July 1944 of Patients of Prisoners of War (of War Camp in Thai)

Note Month	Total Number of Prisoners of War Worked	Patient in Thai		Patient in Burma		Total		
		Number	Rates to Total	Number	Rates to Total	Number	Rates to Total	
1943	Jan.	37,086	18.052	48.6	11,496	31.0	29,548	79.0
	Feb.	42,337	20.634	48.7	12,074	28.5	32,710	77.2
	Mar.	47,009	21.516	45.8	14,987	31.9	36,478	77.7
	Apr.	49,766	19.892	40.0	11,982	23.5	31,623	63.5
	May.	49,489	18.012	36.4	13,288	26.8	31,300	63.2
	Jun.	48,832	24.351	50.0	12,933	26.5	37,284	76.5
	July.	48,116	23.407	48.6	12,192	25.3	25,599	73.9
	Aug.	47,162	23.269	49.3	12,538	26.6	35,807	75.9
	Sept.	46,103	31.225	46.0	13,496	29.3	34,721	75.3
	Oct.	45,277	23.801	52.6	12,141	26.8	35,942	79.4
	Nov.	44,669	19.974	44.7	9,619	21.5	29,593	66.2
	Dec.	44,372	19.497	43.9	12,380	27.9	31,877	71.8
1944	Jan.	43,695	23.289	53.3			23,289	53.3
	Feb.	43,316	22.977	53.0			22,977	53.0
	Mar.	43,173	20.427	47.3			20,427	47.3
	Apr.	43,116	20.324	47.1			20,324	47.1
	May	43,080	20.080	46.6			20,080	46.6
	Jun.	43,028	17.418	40.5			17,418	40.5
	July.	40,960	5.468	13.4			5,468	13.4
Total		383,613		148,872		532,485		

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Encl. no. 5

Doc. 1509

Outbreak of cholera Patient in Prisoners of War				
Name of Branch	Location	Number of Patient	Number of Dead	Note
1st Branch	Kanehabri	19	2	Mainly broke in July
	Kimsaiyoku	69	41	
	Tonbi	13	2	
	Konkoita	1		
2nd Branch	Takanun	176	105	Was raging in Takanun Area in May and June and in Ist attached Branch in June and August.
	Ist Attached Branch	129	77	
	2nd Attached Branch	15	9	
4th Branch	Wanyai	412	19	Broke in Area 125 km from Wanyai mainly June and July, and other areas mainly in July.
	135 km.	166	107	
	140 km.	73	53	
	Hinto Ku	157	74	
	155 km.	74	53	
6th Branch	Hindato	2		
Hospital for Prisoners of War	Ist Hospital	3	2	
	2nd Hospital	21	3	
	3rd Hospital	2	1	
3rd Branch	Burma	34	13	
5th Branch		5	4	
Total		1011	565	

Note: 1. This list shows total number from May to October 1943.  
2. After 6th October 1944 New Patient has not been broken out  
3. As far as the geographical names those are spelt by Roman letters as there are no detailed maps.

Encl. No. 6

LIST of Dead Prisoners of War  
engaged in Construction of the Thai-Burma Railway.

Doc. 1509

Note Month	Monthly Number of Dead at Prison- ers of War Camp in Thai	at 4th Branch of P.O.W. Camp in Malaya	at 5th Branch of P.O.W. camp in Malaya	Total
1943 Jan.	262			262
Feb.	109			109
Mar.	189			189
Apr.	206	Established		206
May.	276	176	Established 2	454
June.	569	414	117	1,100
July.	718	239	278	1,235
Aug.	954	530	139	1,623
Sept.	1,059	493	125	1,677
Oct.	827	400	124	1,351
Total	5,169	2,252	785	8,206
Nov.	578	394	55	1,027
Dec.	344			344
1944 Jan.	679			679
Feb.	416			416
Total	2,017	394	55	2,466
Sum Total	7,186	2,646	840	10,672



Encl No 7

List of dead P.O.W.'s Races 20. Nov, 1943 POW camp in Thai

Location of camp	Nationalities	Army		Navy		Air		Non Com- mand	Total	
		officer	under Non com miss and officer	officer	under Non com miss and officer	officer	under non commiss and officer			
Kanchana- buri I	England	7	374						381	477
	Holland	5	73	1	3				82	
	Aust- ralia		14						14	
Takamun II	England	17	832						849	1060
	Holland	4	200		7				211	
Changara- ya III	England	3	34		7		5		49	682
	Holland	11	165	2	2		1		181	
	U.S.A				2				2	
	Aust- ralia	6	420		22		2		450	
Wanyai IV	England	39	1,356		8		2		1405	1824
	Holland	9	99	1	6	1	4		120	
	U.S.A				1				1	
	Austra- lia	2	287		3	1	4		297	
	New Zealand		1						1	
Kyando V	U.S.A	2	74		14				90	4431
	Holland	14	264	1	18	1	2	2	302	
	Austra- lia		46		2				51	
Hindato VI	U.S.A	1	105	1	1				108	1264
	Holland	19	886	2	60		19		986	
	Austra- lia		170						170	
1st Branch in Saigon	England	2	11						13	13
Total in Each National- ities	England	69	2,712	1	16		7		2805	5763
	Holland	62	1,687	7	96	2	26	2	1882	
	U.S.A	2	74		17				93	
	Australia	8	940		27	1	6		982	
	New Zealand		1						1	
Sum Total.	Total	141	5,414	8	156	3	39	2	5763	
Note	As far as the geographical names, there are spelt by Roman letters as there are no detailed maps.									

6051  
1509

Encl No 3. List of monthly number of Dead from 1942 (Report at POW  
PCN Since Establishment To 1944 (Camp in Thai

Note Month	Total Number of P.O.W. Worked	Deaths in Thai		Deaths in Burma		Total	
		Number	Rates to Total	Number	Rates to Total	Number	Rates to Total
1942	Aug	4,235	2	0.05%		2	0.05%
	Sept	4,234	2	0.05		2	0.05
	Oct	8,711	10	0.12		10	0.12
	Nov	26,484	54	0.20	10	64	0.24
	Dec	29,536	68	0.23	13	81	0.27
1943	Jan	37,086	62	0.17	58	120	0.32
	Feb	42,237	50	0.12	37	87	0.21
	Mar	47,009	255	0.54	7	262	0.56
	Apr	49,766	186	0.37	20	206	0.41
	May	49,489	271	0.55	5	276	0.56
	June	48,832	578	1.18	80	658	1.34
	Jul	48,116	585	1.20	133	718	1.48
	Aug	47,162	800	1.69	154	954	2.02
	Sept	45,103	895	1.94	164	1,059	2.04
	Oct	45,277	656	1.45	171	827	1.83
	Nov	44,699	477	1.06	101	578	1.29
	Dec	44,372	340	0.77	4	344	0.78
1944	Jan	43,695	390	0.89	289	679	1.53
	Feb	43,316	416	0.96		416	0.96
	Mar	43,173	145	0.34		145	0.34
	Apr	43,116	57	0.13		57	0.13
	May	43,083	64	0.15		64	0.15
	June	43,028	60	0.14		60	0.14
	Jul	40,960	40	0.09		40	0.09
	Aug	40,313	37	0.09		37	0.09
Total		6,500		1,246		7,746	

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Chief of 3rd Branch Lt. Col Yoshitada Nagatomi		
Name of Attached Branch	Km	Numbers of Prisoners
Unkawan Attached Branch	108	3,302
Pagatonga Attached Branch	105	6,066
Total		9,368


Chief of 5th Branch Capt. Iotaro Mizutani		
Name of Attached Branch	Km	Numbers of Prisoners
1st Attached Branch	100	1,916

Note: The most part of Patient are in the Hospital at Rabeu and Tanbanga

Chief of 2nd Branch Lt. Col Shirochi Yamagida		
Name of Attached Branch	Km	Numbers of Prisoners
Unkawan Headquarters Branch	200	1,580
1st Attached Branch	203	2,109
2nd Attached Branch	211	5,106
Total		8,795

Note Number of Prisoners of War Attached to other units included in that of 2nd Branch

Note I  
 [1,000] → better shows Number of Branch  
 → Number of Prisoners of War  
 → Boundary of each Branch  
 -X-X- → Frontier  
 - - - - → lines in operation  
 → since heavily established  
 \* → Camp  
 ⊙ → Branch  
 △ → Attached Branch  
 H → Hospital for Prisoners of War





Doc 1509

# Diagram of Distribution of Prisoners of war Camps in Thai

(In June 1943)  
Encl Diagram No. 1

Chief of 6th Branch Major Yoshitaro Hiruko

Name of Attached Branch	KM	Numbers of Prisoners
Hindast Headquarters of Branch	188	3,778
Kuwiye 1st Attached Branch	174	1,551
Burankarl 2nd Attached Branch	190	804
Bangan 3rd Attached Branch	198	936
Total		7,063

Chief of 1st Branch Major Sotomatsu Tomoda

Name of Attached Branch	KM	Number of Prisoners
Kanchaburi Headquarters of Branch	50	3,180
Nongbureakobu 1st Attached Branch	0	1,651
Kinsaiyoken 2nd Attached Branch	160	2,512
Wampon 3rd Attached Branch	110	1,302
Total		8,645


7063

8645

Chief of 4th Branch Lt. Col. Tamie Ishii

Name of Attached Branch	KM	Numbers of Prisoners
Wanyai Headquarters of Branch	120	3,308
Tonchan 2nd Attached Branch	130	3,011
Hannyeu 3rd Attached Branch	140	2,864
Kinsaiyoken 4th Attached Branch	160	2,339
Hintoku 5th Attached Branch	153	1,087
Total		12,609

12609



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
# Diagram of Advance

Encl. Diagram No. 2

Note :

- Billet place
- ⊙ Billet place well equipped
- △ Commissary place
- ⊕ Medical agency

Remark— We have no chance to ascertain the original spelling concerning the names of places and are compelled to spell them in Roman letters.





Note

1. 和 Headquarters of Prisoners of war
2. ⑥ Branch (Figures show No. of Branch)
3. 卍 Hospital
4. 卍 lines in operation
5. — lines newly established
6. - - - - Parallel Routes by Thai and Burma



General  
Burma and Brief

Loth

415 km (Extension equal to Tokyo - Saitama)

While about 400000 c. meter

Building about 14 km

out 150 000

of war about 55 0000


employees about 100,000

30 or 40 months

Prisoners of War Camp in

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Starting Point  
of Construction in




no chance to ascertain the original  
concerning the names of Places, so that we  
applied to spell them in Japanese fashion.



Scale 1:20000

# General Diagram of Railway Between Thai and Burma and Brief List Showing Prisoners of War Camps (about 6.1.1943)

- Note
1. 71 Headquarters of Prisoners of war
  2. 6 Branch (Figuesshow No. of Branch)
  3. 71 Hospital
  4. + + + + Lines in operation
  5. — Lines newly established
  6. - - - - Parallel Routes by Thai and Burma




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General Information

1. Construction
  - ① Extension 415 km (Extension equal to Tokyo - Saitama)
  - ② Earth Works about 4,000,000 cu. m. (Works Filling Rock away about 3,000,000 cu. m.)
  - ③ Bridge Building about 14 km
  - ④ Units about 150,000
  - ⑤ Presence of men about 55,000
  - ⑥ Regular Employees about 100,000
  - ⑦ Period about 10 months (after starting 30 or 70 days of labor camp in Pacific)

Starting Point of Construction in the



Remark - We have no chance to ascertain the original spelling concerning the names of Places, so that we are compelled to spell them in Japanese fashion.

C E R T I F I C A T E

W.D.C. No. \_\_\_\_\_

I.P.S. No. 1509Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ex-Major General Faruo KONUMA hereby certify that I am officially connected with the Japanese Government in the following capacity: Vice Chief of the Legal Research Section of the 1st Demobilization Bureau and that as such official I have custody of the document hereto attached consisting of 91 pages and 11 attached tables in the Japanese and 69 pages in the English, dated unknown, 19\_\_\_\_, and described as follows: Report by Japanese Government on the Burma-Thailand Railway. I further certify that the attached record and document is an official document of the Japanese Government, and that it is part of the official archives and files of the following named ministry or department (specifying also the file number or citation, if any, or any other official designation of the regular location of the document in the archives or files): 1st Demobilization Bureau (former War Ministry).

Signed at Tokyo on this

27 day of Aug, 1946.

/s/ Faruo Konuma (Seal)  
Signature of Official  
(Seal)

Witness: /s/ Kenzo Ishibashi (Seal) 1st Demobilization Bureau  
Official Capacity

Statement of Official Procurement

I, Richard F. Larsh, hereby certify that I am associated with the General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, and that the above described document was obtained by me from the above signed official of the Japanese Government in the conduct of my official business.

Signed at Tokyo on this

28 day of Aug, 1946     /s/ Richard F. Larsh  
NAME

Witness: /s/ J. A. Curtis, 2d Lt. MI     Investigator, IPS  
Official Capacity